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ABSTRACT
The economic, technical and political issues which bear on the
security of nuclear fuel supply internationally are addressed. The
"' structure of international markets for nuclear fuel is delineated; this
includes an analysis of the political constraints on fuel availability,
especially the connection to supplier nonproliferation policies. The
historical development of nuclear fuel assurance problems is explored and
an assessment is made of future trends in supply and demand and in the
political context in which fuel trade will take place in the future.
Finally, key events and policies which will affect future assurance are
identified.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
The security of nuclear fuel supply is a source of economic and political
concern to many countries. These worries result, in part, from a
heightened awareness of the role of energy in national economic health and
security in the wake of the 1973-74 oil crisis, and from an increased
sensitivity to the vulnerability of foreign sources of energy supply.
However, other issues and events specific to nuclear fuel have exacerbated
this general assurance problem. The oil crisis increased the importance
of nuclear power to Western Europe and Japan, and the resulting large
capital-intensive reactor commitments have created their own fuel supply
imperatives. The nuclear fuel supply system is also complex, requiring a
sequence of processing steps, several of which are highly concentrated in
a few supplier countries. Historically, nuclear fuel supply has
experienced serious market and political problems, including substantial
variations in market conditions, market failures and changes in policies
of key suppliers. All of these have contributed to intense concern about
the security of fuel supplies in the future.
Nuclear fuel assurance concerns also interact strongly with nuclear
technology development plans and with international security
considerations associated with nuclear weapons proliferation. The
perceived insecurity of supplies of the low-enriched uranium fuel used in
today's light-water reactors creates an incentive for some countries to
build their own fuel cycle facilities, and to move more rapidly toward new
technologies which use less uranium and thereby reduce dependence on
others. This desire creates a pressure to commit to commercial
development of new technologies earlier than would otherwise be necessary
-- perhaps with results less satisfactory from an economic or technical
perspective. But the most serious implication of this drive for
independence is its effect on the achievment of nonproliferation goals.
Accelerated commitments to enrichment facilities, to spent fuel
reprocessing and plutonium recycle, or to plutonium breeders -- all of
2which could make weapons-usable material more immediately available to
more countries -- are now viewed, in the United States and elsewhere, as
straining the capabilities of the existing nonproliferation regime.
Assurance of low-enriched uranium fuel supply is thus regarded as playing
a key role in retarding such proliferation-sensitive commitments.
However, this relationship is complicated by supplier imposition of new
nonproliferation conditions on access to nuclear fuel that, from a
consumer perspective, may lead to a perception of reduced rather than
improved assurance.
As a result of these complex interrelated concerns, the issue of nuclear
fuel assurance has assumed a central role in U.S. nuclear policies and in
international discussions and negotiations. In this paper we explore the
web of technical, economic and political factors which underlie the
reality, and the perception, of nuclear fuel assurance.
WHAT IS FUEL ASSURANCE?
The term "fuel assurance" refers to a host of issues in nuclear fuel
supply. It may refer to the fuel security of a nation, or the fuel
acquisition problems of a particular utility; it may relate to the supply
of fuel for one's own reactors, or to the guarantee of fuel as a sweetener
for foreign reactor sales. Our discussion centers on the nation as the
unit of analysis, and though the issue of fuel guarantees may arise in the
discussion of reactor competition, our primary concern is with security of
supply for a consumer nation's reactors.
With the focus narrowed in this way, the various aspects of the assurance
issue can be sorted out on the basis of time horizon. We divide the
future (somewhat arbitrarily) into a short-, a medium-, and a long-term
perspective.
THE SHORT TERM: RESILIENCE TO CRISIS In the short run assurance
concerns result from the possibility of interruption of
3previously-arranged fuel supplies. A cut-off or delay might result from a
plant accident or other force majeure, but the main fear is of political
change, either within the supplier country or between supplier and
purchaser. The recent Canadian withholding of U308 shipments covered by
shipments covered by contracts with Japan and others is an example.
The effects of such events depend on several factors. First, it matters
where in the supply chain the problem occurs. Lead times in the nuclear
fuel cycle are long compared to fossil fuels and interruption early in the
process (e.g., U308 supply) is less serious than a problem with
enrichment or, even worse, fuel fabrication. Also, the effects of an
interruption depend on the size of available stocks, and on the country's
ability to gain access to substitute material in the short run, through
spot purchases or swap arrangements. Finally, the consequences depend on
the role of nuclear power in the economy, and on the magnitude of the
interruption relative to the total nuclear fuel requirement.
For a rough measure of short-term assurance, one may estimate the time a
national nuclear-electric system can operate in the face of an
interruption, assuming no access to supplemental supplies. The numbers
are surprisingly large: for a cut-off of uranium supply they range
between three and six years for most major nuclear nations, somewhat less
for countries with small nuclear programs. For interruption of enrichment
supply, the delay before signigicant effect on power output can still
amount to several years. This "flywheel effect" is due to the long
procurement lead times and the large stocks of fuel now held by many
national authorities, processing firms, and utilities.
THE MEDIUM TERM: CONTRACT CONDITIONS In the medium term, over the next
decade or so, assurance has to do with the ability of a country to
contract for future supplies. Utilities, be they private or
government-owned, must commit large amounts of capital to nuclear reactor
construction, and insecurity of fuel supply threatens both this investment
and the reliability of electricity supply. As a result, fuel insecurity
4can be a hindrance to nuclear programs in the competition with other forms
of electric generation, and a threat to general economic health.
There is no simple index of medium-term assurance, but it can be set out
in concept: it is the likelihood that a purchaser can contract for fuel
cycle services, under a set of acceptable conditions, and with reasonable
certainty that the contract will be fulfilled as written. Further, it is
the prospect that a buyer can diversify any residual risks by spreading
purchases over multiple suppliers.
The concept of medium-term assurance takes account not only of the terms
and conditions of available uranium and enrichment contracts but also
involves the likelihood that known resources will actually be exploited.
Some nations (notably Australia) loom so large in the uranium picture that
the threat of withdrawal from the market (as Australia did from 1972 to
1976) can create problems of medium-term fuel security. In addition,
there is uncertainty about the ability of the uranium industry to expand
in the medium term, even if exporter nations are willing and the resources
are there.
THE LONG TERM: RESOURCE ADEQUACY In the long term, toward the end of
the century and beyond, the issue is the uranium resource base--its cost
of exploitation and its size in relation to nuclear power programs.
Uncertainty about likely resources and reserves at various cost levels is
great, and views of the future vary widely. Some analysts regard uranium
as a rapidly depleting resource and argue that competition will soon bid
up the economic and political costs of nuclear fuel. Others see uranium
as a resource whose exploitation is still in its infancy, and regard
present estimates as conservative lower bounds on quantities ultimately
available. They cite the lack of incentives for exploration in the past,
and recurrently unhealthy markets, as reasons to doubt the value of
extrapolations based on currently available information. Perceptions of
long-term assurance will depend on how this debate evolves.
5The linkages between the medium and long term are strong. Uncertainty
about the evolution of the LWR fuel supply system, or its continued
disruption, will influence the mix of technologies used over the next few
decades, as well as the size of the nuclear-electric sector as a whole.
If expectations of fuel availability for present converter reactors (or
their somewhat more efficient successors) are low, then nations will
accelerate research and development, and the deployment of technologies
which are much more uranium-efficient. While in principle there are many
such technologies, those closest to technological maturity, like the
breeder reactor stressed in most programs, involve the use of plutonium
fuels. Research and development aimed at early deployment of plutonium
breeders involves even earlier commitments to pilot plutonium facilities.
For this reason, worries about long-term nuclear fuel availability have a
considerable impact on contemporary international concerns.
ORIGINS OF THE PROBLEM, AND TRENDS
In the discussion to follow, we look for the underlying causes of the fuel
assurance problem, and the particular events that have made it so acute in
the nuclear area. We begin with a brief description of the structure of
the industry including its technical aspects, the degree of economic
concentration and the overlay of international political institutions that
are peculiar to the nuclear industry. Throughout the paper our primary
focus is on medium-term assurance, but the consideration of technical
structure gives an opportunity to evaluate the current system from the
standpoint of crisis resistance or short-term fuel assurance. Because of
the long time lags in the fuel cycle, the existence of excess capacity,
and the size of current stockpiles, the system now seems quite secure from
a short-term perspective.
The discussion proceeds to a survey of the historical roots of the
assurance problem. Subsequent to the creation of the nuclear option in
World War II, a great many events and factors have contributed to the
evolution of the nuclear fuel supply system, and to its problems. The
6most severe problems occurred in the early to middle years of this decade,
with a number of events conspiring to create a crisis of confidence about
the security of nuclear fuel supply. Most of these problems are now
behind us -- though their legacy of uncertainty is not -- with the
important exception of a lack of agreement about the nonproliferation
rules under which nuclear trade will take place.
We then turn to a review of current trends in enrichment and uranium
markets. Enrichment is and will continue to be in excess supply, due in
part to reductions in nuclear power growth expectations but also because
of the entry of new suppliers, including the USSR and new European
enrichment ventures. As a result, enrichment markets are now entering a
period of major change which will provide opportunities for consumers to
increase the security of their supply arrangements. Uranium supply is
somewhat more uncertain, though the near-term issue here is not one of
production capacity but rather of supplier conditions on access. Later,
by the end of the 1980s, there is greater uncertainty about uranium
production capacity, but this appears to have more to do with
uncertainties about nuclear power demand than with resources or technical
capabilities. In the concluding section we examine possible problems that
may affect fuel assurance in the future and the policy issues which they
raise. The most important issue is whether the political uncertainties
arising from nonproliferation concerns will continue or be resolved.
I
7II. STRUCTURE OF THE FUEL SUPPLY SYSTEM
To some degree, issues of fuel security are inherent in the structure of
the nuclear industry. Fuel cycle technology is complex and expensive,
and many countries lack the capability to develop indigenous facilities
in the short or medium term. Moreover, supplies of critical materials
and services are concentrated in a few countries, leading to fears that
existing sources may be used as a political or economic weapon, or may
simply turn out to be undependable. Finally, nuclear fuel is inevitably
coupled to the problem of nuclear weapons, and to the fabric of treaties,
controls, and safeguards that have been designed to curb the
proliferation of weapons capability.
Paradoxically, under current circumstances these system characteristics
combine to provide a high degree of short-term fuel security. To a large
extent, this is due to the technical structure of the industry, and it is
to this aspect of the nuclear cycle that we turn first. Then, we review
the market structure, and the fabric of political constraints, which are
important aspects of the assurance problem in the medium term.
TECHNICAL STRUCTURE
Fuel for a light-water reactor (LWR),the dominant reactor type worldwide,
is the result of a long series of processing steps that begins with the
mining of uranium-bearing ores and ends with a batch of fuel assemblies
which are used to-replace, approximately annually, 1/5 to 1/3 of the
total fuel material in a reactor. In processing, the uranium ore is
milled to recover the 0.1 percent to 10 percent or more uranium
contained in it. The result is yellowcake: U308 with some impurities.
The yellowcake is then purified, and the uranium converted to a new
chemical compound, UF6. At this stage uranium contains only about 0.7% of
the fissile isotope U235 (the remainder being U238). Of these, only U235
can be fissioned by the low-energy neutrons which mediate the chain
reaction.
8Since the concentration of U235 in natural uranium is too low to sustain
a chain reaction in an LWR, the proportion of this isotope must be
increased to about 3% by isotopic enrichment, a technology which has been
developed commercially by only a few countries. A fraction of the
original U235--variable, within limits, by the enricher--remains as
"tails" from the enrichment process. After it leaves the enrichment
plant, the enriched UF6 goes to a fuel fabricator where it is converted
to uranium dioxide (U02), formed into pellets and fabricated into fuel
assemblies. Fuel fabricated for one reactor generally cannot be used in
another.
This sequence of processing steps is more complicated than for other
energy forms, and it requires more time. An idealized procurement
schedule for a pressurized water reactor, one of the two main types of
LWR, is shown in Figure 1. There is a rectangle for each step in the
process, and the first core (or full) loading and several reloads are
shown. The height of each rectangle gives a rough indication of the
quantity of material or fuel-cycle services involved in that step, and
the length represents the time required. Note that the manufacture of
the first core requires more inputs than reloads. Roughly three years
are required to produce the initial fueling, and reloads take more than
twenty months. When there are uncertainties--as when international
purchases are involved or renegotiation of contracts may be
required--utilities generally allow still more time between fuel cycle
steps.
Thus interruption at early stages of the fuel cycle would not have an
immediate effect on output. For example, failure of delivery from a
natural uranium supplier would not result in an interruption of electric
generation for nearly two years. This is very different from the
situation with oil where near-term crises develop rapidly: the time
between supplier failure and impact on economic activity would rarely
exceed three months for oil. For the nuclear fuel cycle, such a short
lag time could occur only in the case of interruption following fuel
fabrication.
I
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Technical measures may further extend the operation of nuclear plants.
Time can be gained by reducing coolant temperature and thus lowering the
power output of the plant. Reduction to 75% of full power can add about
4 months operation if initiated early in a burn cycle; reduction to 50%
might add 12 months under similar conditions. The extension results both
from a reduction in the rate of consumption of fissile material and an
increase in reactivity (due to lower temperature) which increases the
total fuel burnup possible over the cycle. Late in the burn cycle, only
one to three months extension is possible.
The natural flywheel effect of the nuclear supply system is enhanced by
the conservative planning of consumers and suppliers. Utilities usually
order fuel on the assumption that the reactor will operate at a 75-80%
capacity factor. In practice, reactors have been operating at average
capacity factors ranging from 42% (Japan, 1977) to 67% (West Germany,
1976). If a supply interruption were to occur, a reactor running at such
a lower capacity factor usually could continue operation for a number of
months (perhaps 2 to 10) beyond its usual scheduled refueling date.
The mismatch between plans and performance in the past has also resulted
in stockpiles of fuel materials. Where it is possible to extend
operation of a reactor beyond its refueling date, the stock is held as
fresh fuel material; when it proves desirable to refuel on schedule
(e.g., between seasonal demand peaks) the stock may be held in reactor
cooling ponds as irradiated fuel which has not reached design burnup. In
principle, it is possible to reinsert this fuel in the reactor, though
safety regulations inhibit such use.
The fact that fuel supply planning is more conservative than actual
operations (a practice that is justified by the large magnitude of &
reactor capital relative to fuel cycle costs) means that other forms of
flexibility are available as well. The reduced urgency of some
consumers' needs may allow rescheduling (or even reassignment) of
material by a fabricator, enricher or other supplier in order to meet the
11
needs of consumers whose fuel has been delayed or damaged. Suppliers
also are conservative in their production planning. For example, the
U.S. has required enrichment customers to enter into contracts well in
advance of reactor startup. Similar commitments have been required of
participants in fuel cycle ventures in Europe. Since actual deployment
of reactors has not kept pace with the plans on which fuel commitments
were made, surpluses of fuel have been accumulating. Many utilities now
hold one, two or more years forward supply of nuclear fuel.
Thus, the overall trend in countries with large nuclear programs has been
toward large domestic stockpiles of fuel. For example, Italy is entitled
to a 25% share of the output of the new Eurodif enrichment venture
(discussed below). This share would be enough to provide initial cores
for 5000 megawatts-electric (MWe) annually or to sustain 23,000 MWe of
nuclear capacity; during the early to mid 1980s total Italian nuclear
capacity will be at most 4000 MWe. The surplus material could be
stockpiled, or sold, thus contributing to security of supply for Italy or
opening alternate sources of supply or stockpiles for other countries.
Such near-term technical flexibility in the nuclear power industry
protects countries from serious consequences in the case of brief,
occasional interruptions .n the supply of.uel. However, itcwll o. . .,
little to increase actual assurance if the fuel supply is chronically
unstable, or is perceived as being so. The likelihood of interruption
and the ability of consumers to deal with fuel supply problems depend
crucially on conditions within the markets where these goods are traded.
The number of possible points of interruption, the concentration of
supply in a few nations, the problems of restarting fuel cycle flows
after a disturbance, and the relatively high level of institutional
intervention tend to undermine fuel assurance, particularly in the medium
term.
MARKET CONDITIONS
Each of the supply stages in Figure 1 is part of a set of interlinked
markets in nuclear materials and associated processing services. Figure 2
12
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shows the distribution (as of 1977) among nations of current uranium
production capacity, enrichment capacity, UF6 conversion facilities
and fuel fabrication capacity. Also shown is the (1977) distribution
of reactors about the world and the demands they put on the fuel system,
stage by stage. The various fuel cycle steps are interdependent; for
example, enrichment contracts often determine quantities of uranium
procured and the timetable for fabrication. In addition, spot
transactions, swaps, and sharing arrangements often are worked out by
UF6 conversion firms and fabricators. However, assurance concerns lead to
a focus on two parts of the system: uranium supply and enrichment.
ENRICHMENT The international market for enrichment services is highly
concentrated, as Figure 2 shows. Currently, the only significant
suppliers are the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States
has long held a virtual monopoly in commercial enrichment, and contracts
with the U.S. Department of Energy currently serve roughly 90 percent of
the demand of non-centrally-planned countries.
Sales to European nations by the Soviet Union were the first step in the
erosion of the U.S. monopoly position; over the next few years the USSR
will provide enrichment services to Western Eurpoe comparable to those
from the U.S. European enrichment consortia have also entered, or will
soon enter. URENCO, a tri-national consortium of British, Dutch, and
West German interests, made its first commercial deliveries in 1976 and
has plans to expand its enrichment capacity through the 1980s. EURODIF,
a consortium involving France, Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Iran, will make
its first commercial deliveries in 1979 and quickly increase its capacity
to about half that of the United States.
In addition to these ventures, a number of others were announced in the
mid-1970s when it appeared that enrichment capacity might be inadequate
in the next decade. The Eurodif partners planned a new venture, Coredif,
a 10.8 million SWU plant with ownership shares somewhat different than
those of Eurodif. Reduced demand pressure has delayed incentives to
build Coredif, though plans have not been formally terminated. South
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Africa's Uranium Enrichment Corporation (UCOR) has announced plans to
build a commercial facility using a stationary wall centrifuge process.
South African sources indicate that a 5 million SWU facility could come
on line by the mid- to late 1980s. Brazil's Nuclebras, with the
assistance of West Germany, plans a 0.2 million SWU demonstration
facility in the mid-1980s using German Becker nozzle technology. Japan's
Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) is
considering expansion from a current pilot centrifuge plant up to a one
million SWU or larger facility by the mid- to late 1980s. At various
times, interest in acquiring enrichment capability has been expressed by
Australia, India, Iran, Portugal, Sweden and Zaire. Of all these plans,
only the Japanese and South Africa ventures are at all likely to make a
significant contribution to enrichment supply in the next decade.
Although commercial enrichers do make short-term spot sales of enrichment
services under emergency circumstances, virtually all current and future
enrichment sales are under long-term contracts. In the past, DOE
long-term contracts were of two basic types. In the early years of the
U.S. industry, Requirements Contracts were written. Under these
contracts enrichment services are supplied to meet the actual
requirements of a particular reactor. The contract holder firms up the
enrichment delivery schedule six months ahead of the time when the
product is needed. The Requirements contract was replaced in 1973 by
Long-Term Fixed Commitment (LTFC)contracts. Under this contract
customers are required to firm-up the enrichment delivery schedule on a
rolling ten-year basis. The U.S. has recently introduced a third
contract form, the Adjustable Fixed Commitment (AFC) contract which
involves a shorter firm-up period and greater flexibility; those holding
LTFC contracts will be able to convert to the new contract form.
Adjustments to reflect actual reactor operations cannot be made without
incurring penalty charges. Most current and potential foreign enrichers
offer some variant of these contract forms. Urenco offers a
Requirements-type contract, while Eurodif negotiates contracts more like
the AFC contract form. Both set price on a cost-recovery basis, with
15
prices significantly in excess of those charged by DOE. The Soviet
Union's Techsnabexport offers contracts for fixed quantities of
enrichment services for delivery at specified times; prices are reported
to be slightly below those of the U.S.
The international enrichment market is currently undergoing major
changes. The first change is structural: the entry of new suppliers
will replace monopoly with oligopoly and create opportunities for
consumers to diversify risks by contracting with several sources.
Moreover, the existence of excess capacity (discussed below) will create
even more fluid market conditions, with consumers potentially able to
alter their traditional supply patterns more rapidly than if new capacity
additions were just adequate to serve new demand. Finally, enrichment
contract terms are becoming much more flexible in terms of lead-times,
commitment periods, delivery schedules and specification of enrichment
tails assay. The latter will increase the elasticity of uranium demand,
allowing enrichment services and uranium to be substituted for each other
at consumer initiative, within a small range.
URANIUM The production of uranium is concentrated in a handful of
countries. As shown in Figure 2, the U.S., South Africa, Canada, France
and Niger accounted for 97% of non-Communist output in 1977. Resources
are similarly concentrated. Australia, Canada, Niger, South Africa and
the U.S. together have 88% of "resources" as estimated by the OECD (1).
Expanding the OECD definition to include higher-cost or less-certain
deposits would not appreciably alter the overall level of concentration,
though the shares of some countries would differ significantly.
The U.S. and France are net importers of uranium, and will continue so in
the future. However, since they both import and export (with a net
import balance) they represent opportunities for diversification of
supply, and can thus improve short-term assurance against the failure of
supply from any one country. On the other hand, if the concern is power
over market price, it is more informative to look at the level of
16
concentration among net exporters. Here the concentration is no less
great: if one sets aside the U.S. and France, then South Africa, Canada
and Niger account for 95% of remaining production.
We also can make a crude estimate of the concentration of reserves
available for export in the medium-term future. For this purpose, one
should subtract from the OECD total the entire U.S. and French reserves,
and 21% of Canadian reserves (the allotment required under Canada's
domestic allocation program). South Africa, Australia, Niger and Canada
then turn out to have 84% of the remaining reserves, and therefore groups
of these countries have the possibility of cartel-like control of the
world price of U308.
A variety of firms and agencies participate in uranium production.
First, producer country governments are directly involved in resource
exploitation. In Canada, for example, Eldorado Nuclear Ltd., a Canadian
crown corporation, owns the Beaverlodge mine in Northern Saskatchewan.
Canadian provincial governments are part owners of several mining
ventures. The South African government owns 25% of the Rossing operation
in Namibia through its Industrial Development Corporation (though the
continuation of this relationship is an issue in the independence
struggle). France, Niger, Gabon, and Australia all have significant
governmental interests in their domestic uranium industries.
A second group of participants consists of consumers who began in the
mid-1970s to acquire direct interest in uranium production. In a recent
Department of Energy survey (2), 30 of 65 responding U.S. utilities
reported some direct involvement in uranium production. Countries with
major import requirements are moving aggressively to acquire interests in
foreign uranium production ventures. This is especially true of Japan,
West Germany, and France. The means of foreign involvement is through
government corporations or private firms acting with official backing.
Examples would be Germany's Urangesellschaft or France's AMOK.1 In the
1A detailed description of these ventures is provided in a study by NUS
Corporation (3).
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case of companies like these it is often difficult to separate national
interest from commercial motivations.
The third major group consists of private companies which are
commercially motivated. Production is dominated by large companies but,
especially in the U.S., there is an important fringe of smaller
producers. Because of the large scale and high risks, joint ventures are
common.
For a rough idea of the relative importance of the three groups, one can
calculate the shares of production and reserves attributable to each. In
Australia, Canada, Niger and South Africa, 14% of production (and 13% of
reserves) are directly controlled by producer country governments.
Importer country governments, and private companies which appear to have
strong ties to these governments, account for 17% of production (and 9%
of reserves). Other private companies account for 66% of production and
77% of reserves. (These figures do not total to 100% because the
ownership of a small amount of production and reserves could not be
identified.) Special mention should be made of Rio-Tinto Zinc, a U.K.
based multi-national conglomerate with important holdings in Canada,
Australia, and South Africa. Through various affiliates, this firm
controls approximately 25% of total industry production and 24% of
reserves worldwide.
These figures only give the roughest impression of control over
production and reserves. However, they are sufficient to indicate that
consumer country governments do not have a dominant influence in the
market through direct involvement of government agencies or their
proxies. To the extent that is possible to separate public and private
motivations, commercially-motivated companies appear to play a strong
role at this stage of the fuel cycle. However, this activity often must
take place within the constraints of the export policies of producer
governments which have substantial economic or political interests in
uranium and are in a position to exercise considerable market power.
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Long-term contracting is predominant in this industry, and a typical
contract seems to be between 10 and 20 years, The U.S. market is the
best documented. According to a recent FTC study (4), long-term
contracts currently account for about 75% of sales by U.S. producers, and
this percentage has been increasing. For Canada, as of the beginning of
1978 there were export contracts approved (5) totalling some 76,000
STU3082 with delivery scheduled in some cases into the 1990s. By
comparison, Canada's production in 1977 was about 6,100 STU308.
Australia has about 11,000 tons in outstanding commitments but its
production level is only about 1,000 tons per year at present (3). The
contract situation in South Africa is not well known because of secrecy
laws.
Current contracts generally specify a base price with provision for
escalation. The escalation clauses are tied either to the specific
costs of the supplier or to general inflation indices. Many contracts
include so called "market price" provisions which provide that if the
spot price at time of delivery exceeds the escalated base price then some
specified percentage of the difference (sometimes 100%) will be added to
the base price. Another common contract provision calls for the
purchaser to provide a portion of project financing, sometimes on an
interest-free basis.
The spot market is thin, and there is no organized market on the order of
the London Metals Exchange or the Commodity Exchange of New York.
However, there are brokers who are in the business of arranging uranium
transactions.
2Different units are used to quantify uranium output. In the U.S.,
quantities are usually stated in short tons of U308 (STU 0O). In Europe,
quantities may be given in metric tons of uranium metal MTU). Elsewhere,
other units such as metric tons of U308(MTU308) may be used. The conversion
factors are: 1 MTU equals 1.3 STU308 equals 1.18 MTU308.8'
19
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Nuclear trade takes place within a number of unilateral, bilateral, and
multilateral constraints. Although international commodity trade is
often subject to political controls, the rules governing nuclear fuel are
particularly complex. Each cycle step can occur in a different country,
under different legal and political conditions. Moreover, governments in
industrialized countries have a long history of involvement in the
nuclear industry and often are responsible for research and development,
finance, and export promotion. The result is a set of political
restraints and interventions which have a considerable effect on the
supply of nuclear fuel.
Since supplies of uranium and enrichment are concentrated in a few
countries, the current enrichers (U.S. and USSR) and the large uranium
exporters (Australia, Canada and South Africa) are in a position to
impose political conditions on the export of fuel. Below, in a section
on the history of the assurance problem, we review the development of the
policies of these governments in recent years. To prepare for that
discussion, it is useful to look briefly at the international structure
within which nations with nuclear power programs or industries operate,
with special attention to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Euratom.
IAEA SAFEGUARDS The International Atomic Energy Agency serves a number
of functions, including research, education, and nuclear promotion. But
for the purposes of this discussion, the most important aspect of the
Agency is the nuclear safeguards system which it administers. The IAEA
system interfaces with a number of national control systems, and with the
internal system of the Euratom nations.
The objective of the safeguards system is to provide "timely detection of
diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful
nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons...and deterrence
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of such diversion by the risk of early detection" (6). The safeguards
are based on a system of materials accountancy which attempts to strike
materials balances for various facilities, accountancy regions, and for
international flows. The accountancy system is backed up by on-site
inspection of a nation's accounting records, and of the safeguarded
facilities themselves. Also, the IAEA is taking an increasing role in
advising governments on procedures for physical security of nuclear
materials.
The detailed arrangements for participation in the system by a nation, or
by a group such as Euratom, are negotiated case by case with the IAEA
(7). It is important to note that national safeguards systems vary
considerably and that some of a nation's facilities may be under
safeguards while others are not. For example, almost all major
commercial nuclear power plants fall under the system (some at the
insistence of the supplier country), but such involvement in the system
does not necessarily imply a commitment to subject all nuclear facilities
to international surveillance.
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY The NPT contains two basic
obligations, one attaching to nuclear-weapon states and the other to
non-nuclear-weapon states. Each nuclear-weapon state undertakes not to
transfer nuclear weapons, or control over those weapons, directly or
indirectly, and not to assist, encourage, or induce any
non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or control over them (Article I). Each non-nuclear-weapon state
undertakes not to receive nuclear weapons or control over them, not to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, and not to seek or
receive any assistance in their manufacture (Article II).
Under the safeguards provisions of Article III, each non-nuclear-weapons
party to the Treaty is obligated to apply IAEA safeguards to all nuclear
facilities. Each party to the Treaty also undertakes not to export
fissionable material--or equipment for the use, processing or production
of fissionable material--unless IAEA safeguards are applied.
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In complement to these commitments, all parties to the NPT "undertake to
facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy." (Article IV) This
obligation has generally been interpreted as flowing from the
nuclear-weapons states to the non-nuclear weapons states. However, there
has been difficulty in agreeing on which materials and technologies are
appropriate to the "peaceful uses" criterion. It has generally been the
policy of the U.S. -- and more recently of other suppliers -- that
proliferation-sensitive technologies, such as reprocessing or enrichment,
or materials, such as plutonium, are not included under the NPT
obligation.
With the exception of France and Spain, all major industrial countries
have signed or ratified the NPT. A number of other countries have not
done so--among them are Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, India,
Israel, South Korea, Pakistan, and South Africa. As noted earlier,
however, even in these countries many civilian nuclear power facilities
are under IAEA safeguards. In return for assistance in meeting nuclear
energy needs, the customer state accepts the intrusion of safeguards on
its sovereignty.
EURATOM Established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, Euratom was designed
to serve the collective interests of European nations3 in competition
with the U.S. Originally, the treaty called for a supply agency with
exclusive rights to contract for nuclear materials within and outside the
European community. Drafted in the atmosphere of the Suez crisis, the
exclusive trade provision was meant to prevent discrimination in access
to fuel supplies (enrichment or uranium) which might occur with separate
bilateral arrangements or any advantage to particular countries in a
supply crisis.
3At the outset, Euratom included Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg,
France, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany. In the late 1960s,
the Commissions of Euratom, the European Economic Community, and the
European Coal Commission were combined in the European Communities; the
U.K., Ireland and Denmark became EC members in 1973.
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The exclusive trade function was brought into question in the mid 1960s
when France sought nuclear fuel supplies outside the Euratom supply
channels. In 1971, France unilaterally arranged the purchase of
enrichment services from the Soviet Union, an action ruled against by the
European Court of Justice but with little effect. The function of the
Supply Agency has remained an issue within the Community; however, it
generally appears to act as a supply channel (for example, U.S.
enrichment contracts for German reactors are between the U.S. and
Euratom) rather than as a purchasing agent, a rather different market
role.
From the beginning, the Euratom agreement provided for a free flow of
material and information among members. Also, Euratom has had its own
internal safeguards system, which is now in the process of being
coordinated with the accountancy framework of the IAEA. In recent years,
difficulties have arisen because some supplier states have insisted on
acceptance of IAEA safeguards or other conditions on individual Euratom
nations, resulting in conflicting safeguards requirements and European
resistance to this intrusion on regional sovereignty arrangements. In
particular the Euratom principle of free flows of material among members
clashes with "prior approval" clauses for retransfers in some supplier
contracts (discussed below). At this point some Euratom agreements with
major suppliers are interim in nature, and the characteristics of
ultimate fuel supply arrangements are not clear.
As this snapshot makes evident, the special technical, market and
institutional structure of the nuclear fuel cycle has a major effect on
fuel supply arrangements and on fuel assurance. Supply is in the hands
of a few nations, and the proliferation problem brings an unusual degree
of policy intervention by national and international authorities.
Industry structure is not the whole story, of course; the nuclear fuel
supply system has had a particularly troubled history. We proceed next
to a review of the events that have helped make nuclear fuel such an
intense focus of international concern.
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III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FUEL ASSURANCE PROBLEM
The nuclear fuel assurance problem has deep historical roots. In
addition to difficulties originating in the evolving industry structure,
fuel assurance has been influenced by the construction--and revision--of
international political regimes for managing proliferation risks, and by
the commercial ambitions of suppliers of uranium, fuel cycle services and
reactors. Changes in domestic policies and political conditions in
supplier and consumer countries also have had major effects, as has the
struggle toward new forms of economic and political relationships between
developing and developed countries. Finally, there have been fundamental
changes in attitudes towards energy and its relationship to economic and
political security.
In reviewing this history, it is convenient to talk in terms of three
eras:
o The emergence from military programs. The late 1940s to
about 1960: the initial development of reactor technology
and fuel cycle facilities under government sponsorship.
o The surge of commercial and political development. The
years 1960 to about 1973: the beginnings of commercial
development of nuclear power and the emergence of an
international nonproliferation regime.
o The period of conflict and instability. Roughly 1974 to
the present: uncertainties, conflicts and market failures,
in the context of heightened concerns about energy and
security.
The boundaries between eras are not precise and the seeds of one era's
problems (and of some of their solutions) can usually be found in
preceding periods. Nonetheless, this simple breakdown does help in
sorting out the events of the past three decades.
EMERGENCE FROM MILITARY PROGRAMS
In the United States, the era of commercial nuclear power began with the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946; the first proposals for an international
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regime governing nuclear power were contained in the Baruch Plan of the
same year. The U.S. Act legislated civilian exploitation of
nuclear-electric power, but with a federal monopoly on nuclear
technologies and fuel. The Baruch Plan, presented to the United Nations
in June of 1946, called for a similar arrangement internationally--i.e.,
an International Atomic Development Authority, managing all phases of the
development and use of atomic energy, including nuclear fuel. The Baruch
Plan eventually failed, and by the early 1950s independent nuclear
research and power programs were going ahead in several non-nuclear-weapon
states.
In December 1953, President Eisenhower delivered his "Atoms for Peace"
speech before the U.N., calling for international cooperation in the
development of nuclear power, including assistance in research and
development and the provision, by the U.S. and other countries, of
nuclear fuel and other materials. Implementation of the 1953 proposal
required domestic U.S. legislation--the Atomic Energy Act of
1954--rescinding some of the secrecy provisions of the 1946 Act and
authorizing international cooperation.
This cooperation took the form of bilateral Agreements for Cooperation
between the U.S. and foreign governments (22 in,1955 alone). The
Agreements, which first emphasized research activities but eventually
included power reactors and fuel, generally included safeguards and
inspection provisions. The United States also reserved the right to
approve plans for reprocessing fuel it had supplied, to approve
re-transfers to third countries, and to designate storage facilities for
excess fissionable material (such as plutonium) or to purchase such
excess material. Since all parties foresaw the eventual use of plutonium
in nuclear power programs, these provisions were not seen as restricting
its use for reactor fuel.
The creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957,
presented opportunities to put safeguards and fuel supply under an
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international institutional umbrella. But delays in implementing such a
regime--combined with the reluctance of some nations to put their nuclear
futures in multilateral hands, and Congressional reservations about a
possible loss of influence--resulted in bilateral agreements continuing
to dominate technology and fuel transfers for many years. Early
expectations that the IAEA would function as an international fuel
authority, with safeguards following-flows of material, were never
fulfilled.
The 1950s also saw the beginning of power reactor development and
deployment, first in the USSR (a five MWe plant in 1954) and then in the
United Kingdom (four 50 MWe graphite-moderated natural uranium reactors
in 1956). In the United States, development of the more complex
pressurized water reactor (PWR) for use in submarines led to the
Shippingport nuclear power plant in 1957. The boiling water reactor
(BWR) was first utilized commercially at Dresden, Illinois in 1959. Both
reactor types made use of the low enriched uranium producible in large
quantities in the United States enrichment plants, which had been
constructed for weapons purposes in the 1940s.
During this period, uranium production was stimulated and sustained by
the military procurement programs of the United States and the United
Kingdom (and later France). Canadian production began in the early
1940s; a domestic U.S. industry was initiated with AEC encouragement in
1948; and production in Australia and South Africa began in the early
1950s, with purchases by the U.S. and the U.K. In all cases, production
was encouraged by a variety of consumer and producer government
incentives, including discovery rewards, guaranteed purchase prices and
tax concessions. These encouragements were effective, as can be seen in
Figure 3.
Throughout this period, the United States played a dominant role, due to
its general importance in the post-war world, its leadership in
technology, and its monopoly position in nuclear fuel supply. From 1956
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Figure 3. Uranium production 1948-1976.
U.S. Geological Survey Professional Paper
Uranium Resources, Production and Demand,
and the IAEA, December 19/7.
Data up to 1971 are from
820, 1973; thereafter from
a joint report by the OECD
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until mid-1961, the U.S. government--which had sole domestic control of
U.S. uranium and enrichment--sold (or leased) enriched uranium for
research and power uses to other countries, under bilateral Agreements
for Cooperation. At this time, the material was owned by the U.S. or the
recipient government, not by private parties. In 1959, the U.S.
Export-Import Bank began to finance sales of power reactors and fuel
through loans and financial guarantees, thus signaling a national
commercial interest in nuclear power trade.
THE SURGE OF COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
The 1960s and early 1970s saw further development of the institutional
and political framework, along with the first commercial investments in
nuclear power. However, as discussed below, these developments did not
deal entirely adequately with political problems, and conditions in the
uranium industry were far from healthy. Thus, while the 1960s were an
era of major progress, they also contained the seeds of problems which
were to bring a crisis in the mid-1970s.
GROWTH IN INTERNATIONAL REACTOR SALES In the 1960s the first orders
were placed for power reactor exports. By 1966, Canada had sold 225 MWe
of heavy water reactors to Pakistan and India, and the United Kingdom had
sold Magnox reactors to Japan and Spain. Otherwise, the export market
was dominated by the United States: Westinghouse sold eight PWRs (2264
MWe) to seven countries, and General Electric sold 11 BWRs (2369 MWe) to
eight countries by the end of the decade. During this period, Canada was
installing heavy-water reactors and the United Kingdom and France were
deploying gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactors of their own design.
In the Federal Republic of Germany, AEG began to sell reactors under
license from General Electric. In Japan, three companies began tp
develop light water reactors for domestic use, under license from U.S.
manufacturers.
Major changes came between 1967 and 1969 with the formation of Framatome
in France, Kraftwerk Union (KWU) in Germany, and ASEA-Atom in Sweden.
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Direct government participation was involved in all but KWU. Framatome
began to produce PWRs under Westinghouse license for domestic use.
ASEA-Atom developed BWRs of its own design, and KWU began to develop its
own PWRs. KWU secured its first PWR orders in 1969 (to the Netherlands),
while Framatome did not make export sales until 1974, when it sold four
PWRs to Belgium and Iran. As will be seen below, the beginning of
competition for international reactor sales put new strains on the
nuclear fuel supply system, and on the nonproliferation regime.
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES In the 1950s, efforts to provide a political
context for nuclear development focused on bilateral agreements and
regional integration in Western Europe. In the 1960s increased attention
was drawn to the need for a stronger global system. Beginning in 1964
(with intensive negotiations with India), the U.S. began to shift
bilateral safeguards agreements to trilateral agreements including the
IAEA. However, the IAEA functioned as manager of fuel cycle flows only
in a few cases where the recipient country wanted the IAEA to act as the
supply channel.
The major institutional achievement of this era was the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) which was opened for signature in 1968 and which took effect
in 1970. As noted above, the Treaty represents an agreement between
weapons and non-weapons states, involving pledges of peaceful nuclear
cooperation in exchange for agreement not to develop nuclear weapons and
to accept safeguards on all nuclear power activities. The interpretation
and implementation of these provisions has been a continuing and
controversial process, with significant consequences for trade in nuclear
fuel. However, from the standpoint of nuclear power development and the
stability of fuel supply arrangements, this was a time of optimism about
the possibility of separating nuclear power from nuclear weapons.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FUEL CYCLE Until the early 1970s nuclear fuel
supply was primarily an issue of enrichment services, and the history of
enrichment was mostly one of U.S. policy initiatives. From a consumer
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perspective, uranium supply was not a problem; the production capacities
built up in the 1950s were far larger than commercial demand. Moreover,
as the principal source of enrichment, the U.S. often provided the
uranium from its own stockpiles, which were increasing due to domestic
purchase programs. Outside the U.S., the uranium industry picture was
one of severe depression, in the trough between military use and the
buildup of civilian nuclear power.
Uranium In 1959, the United States, foreseeing a saturation of weapons
needs, announced that it would no longer make foreign purchases of
uranium; most existing purchase contracts were to expire by the early
1960s. The result, especially in Canada, was the near collapse of the
uranium industry. As shown in Figure 3, Canadian production dropped from
more than 12,000 STU308 in 1959 to about 3,000 tons in 1965. Even this
level was sustained only through a government stretch-out program, a
transfer of contracts to low-cost producers, and the buildup of a
government stockpile. Only 4 out of 28 producers remained active.
In Australia, the impact was not as great, due to the relatively low
level of production and the high degree of government participation and
stockpile building. In South Africa, the impact of reductions in exports
was small since most uranium production was a by-product of gold mining;
the uranium actually produced after 1960 (about half the peak rate) was
stockpiled. In 1967, the South African government legislated private
ownership of uranium and transferred its calcining facility to the
Nuclear Fuels Corporation of South Africa, Ltd. (NUFCOR), which now acts
as the uranium marketing agent for the gold-mining companies, subject
only to the export controls of the South African Atomic Energy Board.
In the United States, government stimulation of the uranium industry
ended with a moratorium on new contracts in 1958. From 1962 to 1966 the
AEC carried out a maintenance program in which there was an annual
500 STU308 limit per property and a fixed price of $8 per pound. The
program sustained the industrial base while limiting the further growth
of what was already a large stockpile (about 50,000 STU308, excluding
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military stocks). However, the reduction in government demand--from a
high of 17,600 STU308 in 1961 to 10,200 STU308 in 1966--resulted in
considerable contraction in the domestic industry and reduced
exploration. When expected power-plant demand failed to materialize, the
AEC began to stretch out its contracts; by 1970 prices averaged $6 per
pound. The price history is shown in Table 1. Prices of uranium had
fallen since the mid-1950s, but the fall in real prices was even more
severe, as the table shows.
In 1964, the Atomic Energy Act was amended to allow private ownership of
nuclear fuels. In 1966, a year which also saw the first big surge in
domestic reactor orders (20 reactors with a total capacity of 16,400 MWe)
the United States instituted an embargo on the import of foreign uranium
for enrichment for use in domestic reactors. This move isolated foreign
producers from the first surge of U.S. demand (only three reactors were
ordered outside the U.S. in 1966). The first private purchases of
uranium in the U.S. began in 1967 and rose rapidly to 12,700 STU308 in
1971, when the AEC ended its purchase program. As a result, uranium
demand in the United States was kept relatively constant during the
transition from military to civilian use.
Enrichment The effects of fuel cycle developments on nuclear power came
most immediately from changes in U.S. enrichment policy. The 1964 Atomic
Energy Act changed the terms of enrichment availability for domestic and
foreign customers. The new policy allowed toll enrichment of uranium
procured abroad, though the AEC would also sell uranium from U.S. stocks
if requested. Whereas previous procedure had been to provide whatever
amounts of enriched uranium might be desired by bilateral partners, the
new policy was to provide material under the long-term contracts
discussed above. The purpose of these contracts, beginning in 1968, was
to allow longer-term planning by the builders of an expected wave of new
power plants, and by the AEC in its enrichment operations.
The revision in U.S. enrichment contracting represented only a small
change in the U.S. role in the international fuel supply system.
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Table 1
Uranium Spot Prices in the U.S.
($/lb U308)
Current Dollarsa Deflatedb
$9.20
12.50
8.80
8.00
6.20
6.50
7.00
10.50
15.00
21.00
26.00
35.00
42.30
42.90
$18.90
22.00
13.90
12.10
7.00
6.10
6.30
8.40
10.80
14.60
17.80
23.80
28.30
26.70
Notes:
a. Nominal price per lb U308; 1950-1967 from USAEC purchases,
ERDA, Statistical Summary of the Uranium Industry (1976);
1968-1978 from NUEXCO Spot Market Price reports.
b. Deflated by the GNP Implicit Price Index for Non-Residential
Structures (1972 = 100).
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
6/73
12/73
6/74
12/74
5/75
8/75
12/75
4/76
1/78
-
I
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However, it came at a time when the international commercial context was
changing. Other industrialized countries were beginning to enter
international reactor markets, and they very likely saw the U.S. monopoly
of enrichment as putting them at a commercial disadvantage. The
"privatization" of nuclear fuels--part of an overall effort by the AEC
and the Nixon Administrations to put all of nuclear power on a commercial
footing--implied that fuel supply could become tied to private commercial
ambitions in the U.S. as well as to governmental international security
interests. The U.S. dominance of reactor orders abroad could only
increase such concerns. While this commercial motive may have been
relatively unimportant in U.S. decisions, attitudes abroad clearly
reflected a growing concern about U.S. commercial dominance and revealed
the difficulty of distinguishing between commercial and international
security motivations in the new atmosphere of international competition.
One result of these concerns was increased interest in European
enrichment projects. In 1968, FORATOM, the European nuclear industry
organization, had begun plans for ventures which would provide increased
autonomy. In 1970, Germany, the Netherlands and the U.K. established
Urenco, an enrichment venture based on centrifuge technology. In 1972,
the Eurodif enrichment consortium was chartered, using French diffusion
technology. Also in 1970, European utilities and reactor companies began
to contract with the USSR's Techsnabexport for considerable quantities of
enrichment services to be delivered between 1974 and 1990. West Germany
has been the largest purchaser, though others include Sweden, Spain,
France, Belgium, Finland, Italy, Austria and the U.K. These contracts
with the USSR serve to decrease dependence on the U.S. during the few
years remaining before Urenco, Eurodif and other ventures reach full
output.
THE PERIOD OF CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY
By the early 1970s, a number of processes were under way which ultimately
would alter perceptions of nuclear fuel security, and affect the
viability of the nuclear option itself. There were changes in U.S.
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policy regarding enrichment, including new efforts to transfer enrichment
to the private sector and a change to long-term fixed commitment
contracts. In 1974 the U.S. closed its books to further enrichment
orders. At the same time, the uranium industry was on its way from a
buyer's to a seller's market, with additional disruptions induced by the
unexpected loss of Australia as a prospective supplier, massive sales by
Westinghouse of uranium for which it did not have contracts with primary
producers, and changes in Canada's rules for holding domestic reserve
margins. These events and their interrelations are sketched in Figure 4.
Concurrently with these changes, competition for reactor orders was
increasing with the entry of European vendors, and the focus of sales
efforts was shifting to the developing countries. This competition,
combined with the drive for nuclear autarky in Western Europe, served to
accelerate technological change and increase the pace of commitments to
plutonium fuels, breeder reactors, and indigenous enrichment and
reprocessing plants. And, in the midst of all this came the Indian
nuclear explosive test. The Indian explosion, coupled with plans for
. transfers of proliferation-sensitive technologies to other LDCs, raised
fundamental questions about the effectiveness of the existing
non-proliferation regime, and led to retroactive as well as prospective
changes in the political conditions for fuel exports from the U.S. and
Canada.
All these events occured in the space of five or six years and were
highly interdependent. The net result was a sharp decline in the
perceived security of nuclear fuel supply. In the following
sub-sections, we look at these events in more detail, focusing on
developments in enrichment and uranium markets and in the national
policies that determine the conditions of nuclear fuel trade.
ENRICHMENT Because of the dominant role of the U.S. in enrichment, its
domestic policies could not help but affect nuclear fuel supply and
nuclear development. The policy changes of the early 1970s had a
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particularly large impact. By the end of 1972, the U.S. had entered into
Requirements Contracts for 107,000 MWe of nuclear capacity, 25,000 MWe of
which was for foreign customers. In January 1973, the AEC announced its
intention to offer only Long-Term Fixed-Commitment Contracts. Moreover,
the AEC announced that contracts would be issued only for reactors
requiring enrichment of initial cores before July 1982.
By July 1974, ERDA (which incorporated the AEC enrichment functions) had
executed Fixed Commitment Contracts for 166,000 MWe of reactor capacity,
42,000 MWe of which were with foreign buyers. Unfilled requests totaled
91,000 MWe (75,000 MWe foreign). Additional firm contracts were written,
but 44,000 MWe of reactor capacity (mostly foreign customers) remained
unsatisfied. Contracts were offered for this capacity, conditional on
the U.S. proceeding with plutonium recycle, and 27 of these conditional
contracts were written. To deal with the uncertainties imposed on these
customers, President Nixon announced a month later that the U.S. would
"in any event" fulfill the conditional contracts.4
The effects of the Long-term Fixed Commitment Contracts and the closing
of the U.S. order books were significant. Not only did the contracts
seem to encourage commitments to large numbers of reactors worldwide (an
effect consistent with the large number of reactor orders in 1973 and
1974) but the substantial new long-term commitments put considerable
pressure on an already tight uranium market. These effects, combined
with a decline in growth of electricity demand, environmental opposition
and other factors, led to intense pressure in 1975 for readjustment of
the contract arrangements. ERDA responded in mid-1975, with a one-time
"open season" -- a period in which delivery, and thus reactor schedules,
could be slipped. However, first cores were not allowed to slip beyond
1985, and part of the natural uranium feed had to be delivered on the
40f the 27, 18 holders of conditional contracts later terminated, some
because they had been assigned a firm contract by an earlier purchaser.
In 1977, 7 of the remaining contract holders terminated and 2 (both in
South Korea) converted to Fixed Commitment Contracts.
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original schedule. As of mid-1976, foreign capacity covered by Long-term
Fixed Commitment Contracts stood at 78,800 MWe.
Even more important than the pressure on reactor procurement and fuel
cycle activities was the effect on the perceptions of foreign consumers
and suppliers. These events damaged the confidence of consumers in the
reliability of the U.S. as a long-term supplier, and some foreign reactor
suppliers initially saw the U.S. move as an effort to induce commitments
for new reactors which would be purchased from U.S. vendors. The U.S.
move could also have been seen as a pre-emptive effort to tie up
enrichment demand before new ventures abroad were in a position to write
contracts.
In fact, the changes in U.S. contracting policies are probably best
understood as resulting from the effort to shift enrichment to the
private sector, begun in the late 1960s, and the desire to make long-term
enrichment planning more secure in anticipation of a wave of new reactor
orders expected in the late 1970s and early 1980s. While the reasons for
privatization were probably more domestic than international--the
original intention had been to make nuclear power a private endeavor and
there was pressure to cut the size of the AEC budget--there appears to
have been suspicion abroad that the U.S. was beginning to convert its
traditional "promotion in the name of international security" into a
drive for commercial dominance in an increasingly competitive world
market. Whatever the facts, these perceptions could only add to the
growing uncertainty about future availability of enrichment supplies.
URANIUM Up to 1973, the worldwide uranium industry remained weak.
There had been a surge of reactor orders by U.S. utilities in the early
1970s, but it does not seem to have had much effect on U.S. spot prices
(see Table 1), and in any event the rest of the world was excluded from
the U.S. market by the continuing embargo on imports of foreign uranium.
Utilities and consumer governments generally believed that uranium would
be available at low prices; there was little interest in long-term
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contracts, buyers preferring the spot market where prices were falling
(in real terms) in mid-1973.
The U.S. government also provided an additional demoralizing shock: just
as reactor orders were picking up in the early 1970s, the AEC
proposed to dispose of 50,000 STU308 from the U.S. stockpile. To reduce
the impact on the uranium market, the AEC devised a "split tails"
contracting arrangement. Utilities would deliver uranium as if the
enrichment plants were to operate at 0.20% tails assay.5 However, the
plants would actually operate at 0.25% tails assay with the resulting
requirement for additional uranium to be met from the AEC stockpile.
This scheme would avoid a sharp blow to the uranium market, though it did
mean that U308 demand would be about 20% lower than otherwise; it also
showed that changes in enrichment contracting could suddenly alter
uranium market conditions.
With a depressed uranium market in most uranium-producing countries, the
atmosphere was created for government intervention, protectionist
measures, and cartel formation. In the Spring of 1971 a series of
meeting began which were to culminate in the "Club" or cartel of
producers, which was active from 1972 to 1974. The government of Canada
was apparently responsible for the first initiative, through discussion
with Australian officials about uranium marketing strategy. By early
1972, there were reports of a meeting in Paris of representatives from
France, Canada , Australia and South Africa intended to "put some order
into the international uranium market...to coordinate uranium production
and marketing policies" (8).
Cartel documents released later (U.S. House of Representatives, 9) showed
the development of a plan to allocate market shares for two periods,
5In enrichment, the feed (at 0.711 percent U235) is split into a product
stream of, say, 3 percent U235 and a waste or "tails" stream of anywhere
between 0.2 and 0.3 percent U235. For a given fixed output of LWR fuel,
the higher the tails assay the more uranium feed is required.
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1972-77 and 1978-80, and to establish minimum prices and bidding
priorities for sales. The domestic markets of France, South Africa,
Australia and Canada were excluded. Minimum prices were set to rise from
around $5.50 to near $8.00 in the period 1972 to 1978. The cartel
appears to have had little effect: by the end of 1972 the spot price (as
computed by Nuexco) was still below $6.00 per pound. By the end of 1973,
it had risen only to $7. The cartel may thus plausibly be viewed more as
a symptom of the depressed market conditions of an earlier era than as a
successful effort to control market allocations and price in a period of
rising demand for uranium. In this regard, it was very different from
the OPEC oil cartel.
Conditions in the uranium market did ultimately tighten, and prices rose,
far beyond the expectations of the cartel organizers. However, the
causes of these changes must be sought elsewhere. The relevant events
are suggested in Figure 4. U.S. enrichment policy had a strong effect,
for the introduction of LFTC contracts produced a surge in U308 demand in
late 1973 and early 1974. Changes in uranium supplier government
policies had similar, but smaller, effects: in 1972 a newly elected
Labor Government put a lid on Australian exports; Canada (in September
1974) adopted a domestic reserve policy which required that a fraction of
reserves be set aside for domestic use; and France (in April 1974)
withdrew from the supply of uranium due to its new commitment to a much
expanded reactor program. Finally, there was the Westinghouse abrogation
of uranium supply contracts which was announced in September 1975, but
had been rumored since 1974.
Of these events, the largest effects appear to have come from the large
commitments to new reactor capacity in connection with the Long-term
Fixed Commitment Contracts, and (in the United States) from the
Westinghouse abrogations. The effect of the new enrichment contracts was
two-fold: utilities were forced to take a longer-term view of
procurement, and the new demand represented a sizable increase over
previous expectations. The first cores (initial fuel loads) under the
new contracts would require procurement by foreign customers of an
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extra 35,000 STU308(at 0.20 % enrichment tails assay) before about 1980,
compared to deliveries under Requirements Contracts of about 20,000 STU308;
annual requirements for reactor reloads were to be increased comparably
after 1980. The increase in domestic U.S. delivery commitments was much
smaller.
The net result of all this was a shift upward in demand, occurring at the
time when Australia had indicated its unwillingness to enter the market,
and Canadian and French supplies were being reduced. At the end of 1973,
outstanding U.S. utility invitations for bids stood at 40,000 tons (10).
As shown in Table 1, spot prices began to rise in 1973, probably more
slowly than they might under these circumstances since Westinghouse's
short positionwas still secret.
Prices continued to rise during 1974, doubling by the end of the year.
During 1974, U.S. producers and agents sold 17,600 tons to domestic
buyers and 5,200 tons to foreign purchasers, who were appearing in the
United States for large quantities for the first time (the previous year
saw foreign sales of only 500 tons). Moreover, in 1974 the AEC announced
that the U.S. ban on foreign uranium would be lifted beginning in 1979,
and by the end of the year U.S. utilities had contracted for 33,000 tons
abroad. (Previous U.S. purchases abroad were reported by the AEC as
being only 7,000 to 8,000 tons total.) The procurement activities of
U.S. utilities abroad increased the pressure on supplies available to
foreign utilities.
In the resulting seller's market the first "market price" contracts were
written (the Canadian Rio Algom contracts with Duke Power and TVA).
Other changes also began to appear. Increasingly, utilities moved to
arrange procurement directly: by the end of 1974, 68% of total U.S.
forward delivery commitments had been arranged directly by utilities.
The remainder were arranged by reactor vendors or other agents. By the
end of 1974, rumors about the Westinghouse situation began to surface.
So also did suggestions by ERDA that it would have to raise the tails
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assay on which uranium delivery requirements were based (a result of a
revised stockpile policy), thus increasing the amount of uranium that
U.S. and foreign utilities would have to deliver to the enrichment plants.
Uranium prices doubled again in 1975 in this volatile atmosphere. ERDA's
open season on Long-term Fixed Commitment Contracts gave an opportunity
to reduce demand pressure for deliveries in the late 1970s. But
Westinghouse made its first disclosure of its short position in July and
in September claimed "commercial impracticability"6 and declined to
deliver on contractual responsibilities. The result was another scramble
for new contracts and a further bidding up of prices. The main effect
appears to have been on the domestic U.S. market: U.S. purchasers
contracted for 16,200 tons from domestic suppliers and 4,400 tons from
foreign sources; in contrast U.S. producers sold only 900 tons to foreign
buyers (13).
In 1976, there were further changes in the uranium market as consumers
and producers responded to growing uncertainties with a wave of vertical
integration. Instead of contracts for deliveries, producers began to
propose joint ventures with long-term financing arranged by utilities.
This process had actually started during 1975, but the major impact on
procurements waited until 1976 when a record 9,900 tons were contracted
between domestic U.S. producers and consumers. Of this quantity, some
47% was from primary sources in which purchasers had a direct involvement
(13).
A similar picture was emerging outside the U.S. However, the energy
security interests of countries like West Germany and Japan, and the
risks of making investments abroad, led to relatively high levels of
6A claim initially based on the OPEC price increases and embargo but
later changed to allegation of uranium cartel price manipulation. The
Westinghouse contracts affected were virtually all with U.S. utilities;
only Swedish utilities were affected abroad. See Joskow (11). Also, an
excellent analysis of U.S. enrichment policy in this period has been
prepared by Charpie (12).
41
government involvement, either directly or through financing, guarantees
or other subsidies. Government backing for foreign uranium ventures also
reduces the risk of supply interruption by host country governments,
particularly where the latter is in joint venture with the foreign entity.
The development of these patterns of integration appears to have
stabilized the uranium market, though perhaps at the expense of making it
less responsive to future changes in supply/demand relationships. Prices
have not risen and indeed have fallen in constant dollars since
mid-1976. The new procurement level in the U.S. fell back to 12,000 tons
in 1977 (2), a figure comparable to annual production levels.
The uranium and enrichment market stabilization which began in 1976 is
not the end of the story on fuel assurance concerns, however. Indeed,
just as market problems were being resolved, a series of political events
further disrupted nuclear fuel supply arrangements.
THE CHANGING POLICY CONTEXT The new difficulties arose out of an
increasing politicization of nuclear exports due to proliferation
concerns. The precipitating events, indicated in Figure 4, were the
Indian explosion in (1974), and trade deals involving the transfer of
reprocessing and enrichment technology (in 1975 and 1976). The planned
technology transfers were from France and Germany--as new suppliers--to
Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea and Brazil. These events reflected a
change in the international balance of commercial and political influence
in nuclear matters. The entry of new suppliers reduced the leverage of
traditional nonproliferation leaders, like the United States, and this
happened at a time when technological change and international technology
transfers were bringing into question the capabilities of the
nonproliferation regime negotiated during the preceding decade. The
consequences for fuel assurance were profound, since nuclear fuel supply
was the primary remaining form of direct leverage over the nuclear
activities of other countries retained by traditional suppliers.
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Canadian Policy Changes Canada, whose exports had been used by India to
produce a nuclear explosive, responded first with a series of changes in
export policies. In December 1974, Canada called for a renegotiation of
existing agreements and the retroactive and prospective imposition of new
nonproliferation conditions on all uranium contracts with other
countries. While Canada was able to modify agreements with some
countries (for example, Argentina), progress with Switzerland, Japan and
the Euratom countries proved difficult. The renegotiation period ended
in December 1975. After two subsequent six-month extensions had expired
without agreement, Canada announced a uranium export embargo. At the
same time, Canada further increased the stringency of her export
criteria. Under the new regulations, new contracts, or contracts
pursuant to existing agreements, would be approved only if the consumer
country accepted the NPT or agreed to safeguards on its entire peaceful
nuclear program, a provision commonly referred to as "full-scope"
safeguards. Canada also required a prior approval condition on
reprocessing and retransfers to third parties, a pledge not to develop
"peaceful" nuclear explosives, and implementation of Euratom-IAEA
agreements on the latter's safeguards role.
The Canadian embargo was relaxed by early 1978, with a temporary
remission of disagreements aided by events outside Canada. Policies were
changing in the U.S., as discussed below, and the International Fuel
Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) was begun. INFCE provided an opportunity to
deal with the Canada-Euratom dispute by postponing resolution of the
renegotiation issue until the year following the completion of INFCE.
During the interim period, Canada has suspended its original demands for
veto power over reprocessing, enrichment and retransfer; now only "prior
consultation" is required. The interim agreement, developed in December
1977, was made without prejudice as to the outcome of ultimate
negotiations: to grant Canada a suspension of its veto would have
implied Euratom recognition of the Canadian veto power. The interim
agreement thus represents a suspension of the sensitive prior-approval
issue (a position weaker than that in the U.S. legislation discussed
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below). In exchange, however, Canada did achieve the implementation of
trilateral safeguards agreements with the non-weapons states in Euratom
and the IAEA and with the IAEA and the U.K. France, the principal
stumbling block in the Euratom negotiations, was to have negotiated a
separate agreement with the IAEA but has not yet done so; in the interim,
there is agreement that Canadian-supplied material will not be
transferred within Euratom to France.
In addition, there was the negotiation (in December 1977) of an interim
Canadian-U.S. agreement on "double-labeling" (i.e., the imposition of
separate safeguards systems by two countries). Under the agreement, the
U.S. is committed to consult with Canada concerning imposition of
safeguards conditions prior to releasing Canadian-origin material (e.g.,
following enrichment in the U.S.). This arrangement provided the key to
resolution of a disagreement between Canada and Japan. Japan
renegotiated its agreement with Canada to reflect the new Canadian
conditions in January 1978. The new agreement provides for Canadian
approval of safeguards on reprocessing, enrichment, storage and
retransfer.
Another factor which may have been important in Canadian accommodation
was the economic significance of uranium exports to the nation and to the
uranium industry; both remembered the hard economic times which had only
recently given way to rising uranium sales at increasingly high prices.
As early as March 1977, news reports indicated mounting pressure from the
uranium industry for resolution of the safeguards deadlock. The embargo
had tied up contracts worth more than $300 million. Late in 1977, the
Canadian Trade Minister was quoted as saying that Canada was waking to
the "commercial realities" of its safeguards policy (14). Such a mixture
of nonproliferation and commercial interests undoubtedly will remain an
important factor in the future evolution of Canadian policy.
U.S. Policy Changes While the Indian explosion stimulated an early
response in Canada--due to the direct involvement of Canadian
equipment--the effect on U.S. policy was slower to develop. The U.S.
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first responded to the German and French technology transfers by
attempting to intervene directly with the countries involved or
indirectly through the London Suppliers group (discussed below); basic
shifts in nonproliferation policy came later. In part, this delay was
due to the fact that nonproliferation policy was complicated by a growing
pluralism and ambiguity in the policy formulation process.
The Energy Research and Development Reorganization Act of 1974 began to
open up what had been a monolithic nuclear policy process within the AEC
and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Licensing of exports was
assigned to an autonomous Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which began
to play a day-to-day, independent role in interpreting nonproliferation
conditions. Such a system would have been relatively stable in an era
with little change in international nuclear problems and little need for
change in U.S. policy. However, with rapidly changing international
conditions, the NRC was put in the uncomfortable position of having, in
its routine licensing decisions, to play an important foreign policy
role. In March 1975, the NRC began a policy of closer scrutiny of
potentially sensitive exports by the commissioners themselves; this
change in procedures delayed licenses and was widely interpreted abroad
(and still is) as an export ban. In West Germany, the Research and
Technology Minister stated that the "export ban underlines the need to
become as independent as possible from foreign energy sources" (15).
That even small changes in procedures could raise such concerns revealed
a growing uncertainty about the reliability of U.S. supply, and
increasing sensitivity to the security of nuclear fuel generally.
In 1976, the question surfaced in the Congress. Attention focused on the
conditions imposed on U.S. exports, and on the roles to be played by a
host of federal agencies. The legislation considered in this period
included almost all the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Act of
1978.7 This activity resulted in little actual change in U.S. policy.
7The emerging mood of the Congress is well reflected in an article by Senator
Abraham Ribicoff (16). He proposed measures, including reactor market sharing
and provision (or withholding) of fuel, to lower the incentives for other
suppliers to transfer proliferation-sensitive materials and technology.
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However, lack of clarity in U.S. export procedures, growing dissonance in
the policy formulation process, and indications of incipient changes in
the basic assumptions and modes of action underlying U.S. policy, tended
to increase uncertainties about the market and sovereign costs which
would be associated with future supplies from the U.S.
These issues came to a head in the later days of the 1976 presidential
campaign. The Ford Administration promulgated a new domestic policy on
reprocessing and recycle of plutonium: technological extension of the
fuel cycle would be considered necessary only when economic or other
benefits outweighted proliferation risks. While this was a relatively
conservative statement compared to those emerging in Congressional
debates and in some-parts of the arms control community, it established
an unusually strong linkage between domestic nuclear policies and foreign
policy objectives.
The Carter Administration carried the debate further in a major
announcement of April 7, 1977. Domestic reprocessing and recycle of
plutonium were deferred indefinitely and the commercialization phase
(though not longer-term R&D) of the breeder reactor program was
suspended. Alternative fuel cycles, which inhibited access to weapons
material, were to be emphasized in U.S. programs; fuel assurance was to
be improved by increasing U.S. enrichment capacity and re-opening the
order books; the historic refusal of the U.S. to export enrichment and
reprocessing technology would be continued; and the U.S. would explore
ways to insure adequate energy supplies multilaterally while reducing the
spread of capabilities for nuclear explosive development. It was at this
point that the President called for an International Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Evaluation (INFCE). In addition, there was, a suggestion (in response to
a press question) that supply of fuel by the U.S. could be used as an
instrument of compulsion as well as assurance.8 In subsequent actions,
8The statement was unclear: "If we felt that the provision of atomic
fuel was being delivered to a nation that did not share with us our
commitment to nonproliferation, we would not supply that fuel."(17)
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the U.S. initiated the renegotiation of Agreements for Cooperation to
reflect new nonproliferation conditions.
During this same period the new Congress was completing a committee
reorganization which abolished the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
and established the exclusive oversight of international nuclear policy
in the House International Relations and Senate Foreign Relations
Committees. This step, and the emergence of an Administration position,
led eventually to the passage of the Nonproliferation Act of March 1978
(NPA 78). The terms of this Act are the result of a process of
compromise between Congressional attitudes and those of the departments
and agencies of the executive branch. The major difficulty was to find a
way to establish uniform conditions for nuclear exports, which would make
approval predictable (if basic nonproliferation conditions were met)
while preserving flexibility for the executive in dealing with specific
situations. To provide this, the Act specifies sequential and
conditional procedures involving the various governmental actors (the
NRC, the President, the Departments of State and Energy, the Arms
Controls and Disarmament Agency, and Committees of Congress).
In summary, the Act says the following. In order to qualify for
U.S.-supplied fuel, an importer must have an Agreement for Cooperation,
negotiated by the Secretary of State with participation by DOE, ACDA, and
NRC. The requirements for such an agreement include: 1) safeguards on
all exports and material produced with exports, 2) IAEA safeguards on all
the peaceful nuclear activities of a non-nuclear-weapons country
("full-scope" safeguards), 3) a pledge not to use any U.S.-provided
material or equipment for research into or detonation of an explosive
device, or for any other military purpose, 4) the U.S. right to require
return of any exported material in the event of an explosion or
abrogation of an IAEA safeguards agreement, 5) U.S. prior consent before
retransfer, reprocessing, enrichment, or storage of any exported
material, 6) adequate physical security measures, and 7) a guarantee that
any facility built using technology transferred under the agreement would
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be subject to similar conditions. Many of these criteria for Agreements
can be exempted by the President for foreign policy or security reasons,
though the President is directed to renegotiate all existing Agreements
for Cooperation to incorporate the new antiproliferation restrictions.
Various committees of the Congress then have the opportunity to review
the Agreements.
The 1978 Act also adds two other amendments containing criteria which are
to be appled by the NRC to each specific export license. They are
virtually the same as those to be included in the Agreements for
Cooperation, except that only the full-scope safeguards requirement
(number 2 above) can be waived by the President, under limited conditions
and subject to Congressional disapproval. Thus, while the provisions in
the Agreements for Cooperation are subject to negotiation between the
U.S. and the recipient party, the criteria governing license approvals
are almost all imposed by the U.S. legislation. The process of obtaining
an exemption on the full-scopes condition, starting with a Presidential
decision, is a laborious one, involving several congressional committees
and consulations with the Departments of State and Energy, ACDA, and the
NRC.
Not suprisingly, then, a basic objection to the Act, raised by a number
of countries, is that it does not provide a clear and predictable export
policy. Many of the situations to which it applies will not satisfy the
general conditions, and recourse to the exemption procedures will be
required. This procedure introduces less predictable factors (e.g.,
Presidential override of the NRC sustained by Congress for every export
license). It is thus difficult for some countries to regard the Act as
providing much greater assurance of supply, especially those that have
not accepted full-scope safeguards or have nuclear technology commitments
which would be threatened by the prior approval conditions. Ironically,
some of these are countries in which assurance may be most important as a
nonproliferation measure. Perhaps attempting to compensate for lack of
manifest improvements in assurance through export policies, the Act
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creates a separate institutional mechanism to deal with fuel assurance
concerns, an International Nuclear Fuel Authority. The extent to which
such a mechanism can deal with fuel assurance concerns--especially those
of countries whose primary uncertainty is U.S. export policy--is an issue
of considerable importance.
Other Suppliers Australia is in the process of defining its export
criteria after a reappraisal of its role in the uranium market and in the
nonproliferation regime. An Australian-Finnish agreement in 1978 may
prove to be a model for subsequent bilateral arrangements with other
customers. Under the accord, Australia reserves the right to prior
consent before re-export of uranium to third countries. The agreement
contains a pledge not to divert any Australian material to military
purposes. IAEA safeguards are to be applied, and Australian consent is
required before re-enrichment or reprocessing of supplied uranium can
take place. Australia reserves the right to suspend shipments in the
event of a failure to observe the terms of the contract or adhere to IAEA
safeguards. Australia's requirements are thus generally in line with
current U.S. export conditions.
Similarly, the position of the USSR is close to that of the U.S. The
USSR will provide toll enrichment services only to those countries who
have agreed to full-scope IAEA safeguards. Also, the USSR also puts
conditions on retransfers of Soviet-enriched uranium to third parties.
The Soviet record is one of a strong supporter of the NPT regime.
Several developing countries, such as Niger, Gabon, and Brazil are or may
be sources of uranium. Indications are that the export policies of most
of these countries will be governed by commercial needs; nonproliferation
and other political conditions generally do not appear to apply.
The export policies of key European suppliers, most importantly of
France, are not yet clear. An important forum for discussion of export
policy issues has been the London Suppliers "Club", an initially secret
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group of representatives of nuclear exporting countries. During the past
three years the group has agreed to increasingly restrictive common
export conditions. However, there is not complete accord on the much
more stringent conditions recently adopted by the U.S. and Canada. Thus
though recent changes in U.S. and Canadian policy can be seen as
desirable efforts to strengthen the international nonproliferation
regime, there remains considerable tension between the U.S. and other
supplier and consumer countries, who may perceive a different balance of
commercial interests, energy insecurities and nonproliferation concerns.
Since the principal source of direct leverage of the U.S. and its
nonproliferation allies--on consumers and other suppliers alike--is
through the control of fuel, the security of fuel supply has become
closely linked to differences over nonproliferation conditions as they
relate to nuclear development internationally.
The resolution of these differences--or the failure to resolve them--will
be a major factor in the future evolution of the nuclear fuel supply
system and will affect the reality and perceptions of nuclear fuel
assurance. At present, many of these disputes are in suspension or under
negotiation. The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation has
provided a breathing space for national re-evaluation of nuclear power
issues and objectives in an international context. It has also allowed a
temporary remission in particular disagreements, such as that between
Canada and the Euratom countries. However, probably the most important
fact about INFCE is that it will end, in late 1979 or early 1980. The
reconstruction of a common political and commercial context for nuclear
power development, and thus nuclear fuel supply, must be well under way
by this date if fuel assurance is not to suffer new setbacks.
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IV. TRENDS IN DEMAND, CAPACITY AND STOCKS
For most of its history, the nuclear fuel market has operated in an
environment where political constraints on exports were uniform over most
of the world, and where export license procedures were predictable. It
is only in the last two or three years that political conditions on fuel
trade have appeared to be such a serious threat to nuclear fuel
security. Both in INFCE and elsewhere, efforts are under way to
construct a new international understanding, and complementary national
policies, which will provide a smoothly-functioning, dependable system of
fuel trade while meeting nonproliferation goals.
There is hope that such an accommodation can be reached, and if this
proves so then the outlook for nuclear fuel assurance is favorable. With
nuclear capacity growth lower than expected, the pressure on fuel supply
systems has been reduced. Tight market conditions and the fuel assurance
concerns of the past have stimulated investments in uranium mines and
mills and in additional enrichment capacity. Conservative planning by
utilities and governments has resulted in a build-up of fuel stocks which
provide a cushion against future problems. We are also beginning to see
increasing diversity in nuclear fuel supply industries and the creation
of markets with greater stability and flexibility in responding to
changing conditions. With some help from the intrinsic resilience
provided by long fuel cycle lead-times, it has been possible to avoid
interruption of nuclear electricity generation despite extreme shifts in
supply conditions.
Of course, optimism must be tempered by recognition of the problems that
remain. There is a potential for disruption due to cartelization of
uranium supply, or the failure of some key producer. Also, there is
concern about the ability of producers to expand capacity in the medium
term. And ultimately, as we shall see, there is uncertainty about
resolution of the political differences which affect the terms of
international trade in nuclear fuel. In search for the discernable
trends, and remaining problems, we look first at enrichment, and then
turn to uranium and stockpiles of low-enriched fuel.
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ENRICHMENT
During the next several years, the availability of enrichment will
increase, both in total capacity and in diversity of sources. Additions
currently committed are shown by the solid lines in Figure 5, along with
the most recent OECD estimates of demand.10 Ventures planned but not
committed could add to this capacity in the latter years of the period,
as the dashed lines indicate. Fear of inadequate enrichment capacity may
have been an assurance problem in the past; but as Figure 5 makes clear,
the next decade will be a period of considerable excess capacity. What
is more, this surplus exists for subsets of nations as well as for the
world as a whole. If each country is credited with its equity share in
any venture in which it participates, plus its contracts with other
suppliers, then one finds that only the URENCO group (largely West German
utilities) faces tight supplies through the 1980s. Japan, the Eurodif
partners and a group of "all others" are each going to be in a
circumstance where supplies substantially exceed reactor requirements. 11
Of course, in interpreting these figures a number of qualifying factors
must be kept in mind. The demand calculations are based on the OECD/IAEA
nuclear growth estimates, assuming 0.20% tails assay and a 70% capacity
factor for reactors. These assumptions tend to overstate requirements:
some enrichment will be done at higher tails assays (at a 0.25% assay,
about 13% less enrichment is needed than at a 0.20% assay), and reactor
capacity factors have been consistently below 70%. Moreover, the reactor
growth projections are based on firm plans only out to the mid 1980s;
beyond that time they are based on expectations that historically have
1OThe capacity of enrichment facilities is stated in Separative Work Units
(SWU). About 111,000 SWU are required to enrich the fuel to operate a 1000
MWe LWR for one year at 70% capacity factor(assuming a 0.25% tails assay for
enrichment plant operations). The Soviet capacity shown is not the total
USSR enrichment capacity but only that capacity which has been contractually
committed to exports outside the Soviet Block. The quantities indicated are
thus a lower bound on those potentially available.
11These analyses are presented in greater detail in Neff and Jacoby (18).
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Figure 5. Enrichment capacity expansion as compared with projected reactor
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available from the USSR is only that committed under current contracts;
presumably it could be increased.
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overstated actual growth. Thus the estimates shown are probably best
thought of as upper bounds on demand.
The supply projections are uncertain as well. Capacity actually utilized
could be less than shown. The U.S. has already delayed planned
investments to increase the capacity of existing diffusion facilities,
and has postponed commitments and reduced the size of new enrichment
facilities using centrifuge technology. Changes as of the end of 1978
are already included in Figure 5, but U.S. plans could slip further if
demand forecasts continue to be reduced, or if there is a shift to other
suppliers. In the latter years of the period, capacity could be greater
than that shown, but it seems unlikely that reactor growth will pick up
enough to justify substantial additions to capacity.
The data in Figure 5, and the recent changes in U.S. enrichment plans,
reflect a fundamental change in the enrichment market. With such excess
capacity and the entry of new suppliers, there is a possibility of
substantial shifts in the worldwide pattern of enrichment trade. These
shifts could be motivated by consumer desires to lower risks by
diversificaton of supply or to avoid supply situations in which political
risks are high. Of course, previous contracts, equity holdings and
regulatory constraints tend to reduce this flexibility.
URANIUM
The international uranium market, which went through such extreme changes
in the mid-1970s, now appears stronger and less susceptible to large
fluctuations. Annual transaction volumes have decreased to levels more
comfortably in line with annual production. Producers again have
material available for spot market sales and capacity for future
delivery. Prices are declining in constant dollar terms (see Table 1)
and there are reports that the "market price" contracts of recent years
are becoming less common. These changes reflect a swing away from the
extreme seller's market of the 1974-77 period. While the market could
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repeat its historical pattern of extreme changes in transaction volumes
and prices, it is likely that the fluctuations will be smaller than in
the past simply because the base of firm civilian demand is larger.
Moreover, in the domestic U.S. market at least, better mechanisms are
evolving for dealing with fluctuations, such as mediation clauses for
price disputes and agents and brokers who can arrange loans or sales of
material or act as leasing intermediaries. Internationally, such market
instruments are less developed, though there is evidence that enrichment
suppliers (like Eurodif) can play a mediating role.
In assessing trends over the next decade or so, a number of factors are
relevant. Uranium demand will be influenced by reactor growth and
operating performance, contract terms for enrichment, and the stockpile
aspirations of utilities and consumer governments. On the supply side,
prospects depend not only on the amount of material that is there to be
found (which of course is uncertain) but on the level and quality of
exploratory efforts in different countries and on the many factors which
determine the supply from known resources (environmental restraints,
political conditions, availability of finance, and so forth.). Moreover,
both the supply and demand for uranium can be influenced by changes in
technology. Many of these factors are interactive: for example, reduced
expectations about demand may cause supplier governments to restrict
domestic expansion of uranium industries and regulate exports. Given
this complexity and the large uncertainties involved, it is not
surprising that there is a wide variation in perceptions of future market
conditions.
URANIUM DEMAND The demand for uranium is most heavily influenced by
reactor capacity growth. Reactor growth in turn is itself only weakly
dependent on uranium prices (which may account for 10% or less of
delivered nuclear electricity costs). Decisions to build reactors are
influenced more by the desires of electric utilities to maintain a mix of
generation sources, public acceptance and regulatory conditions, and
capital availability (especially in LDCs). Nuclear expansion also is
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affected by the problems associated with planning lead times which are
long relative to those of conventional fossil fueled generation
technologies.
Changes in nuclear technology could affect uranium demand in several
ways. Improvements in uranium utilization in light-water reactors could
reduce demand by 15% or more, compared to projections based on present
technology and practices; much of this gain might be had well before the
end of the century. Similarly, advances in enrichment technology, such
as laser isotope separation, would allow an increase of about 30 percent
in the fuel manufactured from a given input of U308. Ultimately, new
types of reactors--such as very efficient thermal converters or breeder
reactors--could lead to dramatic reductions in uranium demand (a factor
of perhaps three for converters and fifty for breeders). However, major
changes in reactor technology cannot appreciably affect demand for
uranium until some time late in this century or early in the next.
As seen above, enrichment contracting requirements and governmental
actions play a significant role in the near term. Until recently,
government planners, here and abroad, have analyzed uranium demand in the
early to mid 1980s on the basis of enrichment contracts rather than
actual reactor requirements. In the mid 1970s this was a perfectly
reasonable assumption, for uranium needs were in fact determined by the
terms of LTFC contracts with the U.S., the dominant enrichment supplier.
In addition, these forecasts of uranium needs were predicated on DOE
plans to raise tails assays in the 1980s in order to meet what appeared
then to be large contract requirements with the available U.S. enrichment
capacity. In the past year this picture has changed. Reactor demand has
slipped far below that anticipated, resulting in a reduction in the
overall expectation of uranium demand, and the resulting excess
enrichment capacity has removed the need to increase tails assays. As a
result, requirements for natural uranium will be significantly less than
originally anticipated and those utilities and countries that contracted
for uranium on the basis of the earlier assumptions will find themselves
with growing stocks. Moreover, the introduction of Adjustable
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Fixed-Commitment Contracts in the U.S., and real competition from abroad,
has increased the flexibility of fuel planning.
Stock-building is another important influence on demand. As noted
earlier, uranium stockpiles (natural or enriched) have been built for
several reasons. They have appeared accidentally, as a result of
mismatch between reactor needs and enrichment or uranium contracts; they
also have been built up intentionally as a cushion against short-term
market disruption or as part of a longer-term fuel assurance strategy.
In some cases the quantities are large. For example, Japanese utilities
have contracted for over 150,000 tons of U308, with more than 85% of this
to be delivered before 1990; this contracted supply may exceed actual
reactor needs duing this period by as much as a factor of two.
Observation of past contracting behavior suggests that as long as
significant fuel supply uncertainties remain, consumer planning will be
biased in favor of uranium contracts exceeding actual reactor demand.
This conservatism may weaken somewhat if stocks accumulate and the trend
toward increased supply stability continues.
URANIUM SUPPLY The future supply of uranium will be a function of the
resource and reserve base, the conditions under which the supply industry
operates, and the nature of the market system in which uranium is
traded. The first of these factors is important only in the longer term,
since reserves already proven appear adequate to fuel any reactors built
over the next two decades. However, industrial development and market
performance are issues of pressing concern in the near and medium term.
Uranium development problems are similar to those in other mineral
industries: there is an increasing desire of regional or national
governments to control or obtain compensation for the environmental and
social impacts of extraction activities, and to realize the best return
for the resources. And as is obvious from earlier discussion,
difficulties are amplified by the strategic role of nuclear fuel in
energy supply and weapons proliferation and the regulatory scrutiny
generally applied to things nuclear.
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Uranium industries in various producer countries are at very different
stages of development; they operate in different geological environments
and deal with different sets of political, institutional and
environmental problems. In the United States, a large number of
independent companies are involved in production from relatively small
deposits in sandstone formations in which new inexpensive high-grade
deposits are increasingly unlikely to be found. The activity is
moving--in the classic pattern of mineral industries--toward lower-grade
or deeper and more costly deposits. The major issues are rising labor
and other costs, increasingly stringent environmental requirements, and
state efforts to capture rents through extraction taxes. The relatively
weak coupling between the U.S. and international uranium markets has
restricted the importance of foreign policy issues, which tend to enter
more at the enrichment stage.
In Canada, large high-grade deposits are to be mined by relatively few
companies, one of the largest of which has significant government
involvement. Despite a history of uranium exploration and exploitation,
new discoveries of large, high-grade deposits continue to be made. The
major influences on development include increasing provincial involvement
(economically and environmentally) and--since most uranium is
exported--the need to insure stable conditions.(and revenues) for the
domestic industry while pursuing nonproliferation objectives.
Australia is in a position similar to that of Canada, except that its
industrial development is less advanced and there are greater internal
political differences centering on nonproliferation, environmental
effects and aboriginal-rights. Again, new discoveries of very large,
moderate-grade deposits are occurring, and may be expected in the
future. The large potential for expansion of Australian and Canadian
uranium output raises the question of price maintenance. We will return
to this issue, and the possibility of a price-setting cartel.
South Africa continues its export of uranium produced as a by-product of
gold, and has plans to recover uranium from old gold slimes and even to
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produce gold as a by-product of uranium. Thus South Africa is in a
position to expand output somewhat and is doing so. The largest prospect
for Southern Africa, however, is Namibia, where the Rossing mine is
producing at about 3,500 tons per year. Major expansion is feasible and
other significant deposits appear to exist, although political change may
threaten this output or alter the terms of its availability. Central
African production--from Niger and increasingly from Gabon--is becoming
more significant in the world supply picture.
Table 2 shows two recent projections of uranium production capacity, one
by the OECD/IAEA (1) and one by McLeod and Steyn of NUS Corporation (3).
These data show an improving situation from the standpoint of diversity
of supply. The U.S., Canada and South Africa continue as major sources,
and Australia appears ready to assume a significant market position.
Moreover, the "other" category includes a growing number of countries who
may be small producers but nonetheless offer the possibility for consumer
risk-spreading by diversification of supply sources.
On the question of price, the situation is less clear. With the U.S. as
a net importer, Canada, Australia, South Africa and Niger will dominate
supply to international trade. As noted earlier, these four nations hold
over 80% of known reserves, and any of several subsets of this group
(e.g., Canada and Australia) could attempt to establish another
international cartel. The longevity of such arrangements is always a
question,12 but there seems little doubt that the machinery is in place
to manage the price. Both Canada and Australia have government boards
with control over export conditions, including price, and both countries
have similar political and economic interests.
Of course, such a cartel would very likely encounter the same problems
that have plagued other arrangements of this kind. The nations
12Eckbo (19) reviews the history of some thirty international commodity
cartels and for the successful ones the usual life has not exceeded four
to six years. Oil appears to be an exception, but whether uranium will
fall in this category is not known.
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Table 2
Projections of Uranium Production Capacitya
(Thousands of STU308)
1977 1980 1985 1990
OECD NUS OECD NUS OECD NUS OECD NUS
U.S. 19.1 16.0 29.4 23.0 46.8 27.0 61.1 35.0
Canada 7.9 7.2 10.3 9.4 16.3 12.0 14.7 11.0
Australia 0.5 0.7 0.7 1.2 15.3 13.0 26.0 24.0
South Africa 8.7 6.5 15.2 10.4 16.3 13.0 15.6 11.0
Other 6.6 5.7 13.3 11.5 25.0 12.0 25.7 11.0
TOTAL 42.9 36.1 68.9 55.5 119.7 77.0 143.1 92.0
a. The OECD projection is from Reference (1); the NUS
projection is from Reference (4) maintaining the price
must be able to control net exports from their own
suppliers. If domestic capacity (say, in Canada)
expands beyond that which the market can take at the
cartel-set price, then government authorities must find
a way to allocate production among domestic producers.
With many domestic operations, each with several
international partners, this could prove a very
difficult task.
I
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SUPPLY-DEMAND BALANCE Another issue that arises in discussions of fuel
assurance is the capability of the industry to expand in the medium
term. The mineral resources may be there, and the market conditions
favorable, but it may be difficult to marshal the capital, labor or
environmental clearances necessary to expand capacity. Or at least there
may be long delays.
Different assumptions about these problems are implicit in the estimates
in Table 2. In Figure 6, these capacity figures are compared with
uranium requirements derived from OECD/IAEA reactor growth estimates. As
discussed above, these growth estimates are probably high. The tails
assay for enrichment is set at 0.20%, and no consideration is taken of
intentional stock building.
Both supply projections show an excess of production capacity over
reactor needs in the near term. In the longer term, the OECD uranium
capacity forecast remains above projected reactor needs while the NUS
projection drops below projected demand in about 1987. It is in the
early 1980s that the OECD/IAEA and NUS estimates begin to diverge
significantly. Both projections are based on industry expansion plans
and normal development of reserves and resources. However, the OECD/IAEA
projection is a "could do" estimate which assumes success in dealing with
the problems of industry expansion. A number of difficulties of doing so
are discussed but not explicitly reflected in the estimates. The NUS
projection, on the other hand, assumes continuing difficulty in
fulfilling plans;. a delay of three months per year in all industry plans
is assumed as well as a 3 percent loss from each year to the next due to
declining grade.
The combination of the NUS forecast, or others like it, and an
independent projection of reactor demand may suggest to some that capital
expansion in the uranium industry will not keep pace with the expansion
of nuclear electrical capacity. But this is not necessarily the case.
When such independent projections are made for any resource, there almost
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Figure 6. Comparison of potential uranium demand with uranium
production capacity projections. Demand is based on the OECD/IAEA
projection [1J. The two uranium production capacity projections are
from references [1] and [3].
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always is an apparent mismatch between capacity and demand, especially as
projections are extended beyond the time horizon of the firm industry
commitments. The resulting "gaps" are often misinterpreted as portending
important economic and security problems.
However, the independent projection of capacity and demand neglects the
fact that these quantities are kept in balance over time by a dynamic
process of equilibration in which producers and consumers adjust their
plans, expectations, and activities. The "gaps" which appear in
independent forecasts of capacity and demand simply indicate the
magnitudes of the adjustments which must, and generally will, be made to
the plans or assumptions on which the projections are based; they are not
unavoidable catastrophes. The crucial issue is the process by which this
adjustment takes place. Many depletable natural resources are traded in
well-organized commodity markets, with only a minimal level of direct
political intervention. In these cases the process is simple, if
sometimes painful. Rising demand leads to increased prices, which
provide incentives for increased production and dampen demand growth.
The risks of dealing with fluctuations and uncertainties in the process
are shared by suppliers and consumers by means of long-term contracts
and, occasionally, multinational marketing agreements.
The process of equilibration in uranium is more complicated than for many
other natural resources, due to the special characteristics of the fuel
cycle, demand inelasticity, and heavy government involvement.
Nonetheless, there is strong evidence that uranium will prove very
similar to other resource industries in its responsiveness to price and
expected future market conditions. For example, there has been a strong
increase in exploratory activity, and in mine and mill investment over
the past three years. Indeed the major factor in discussions of
continued commitments to this industry is the likelihood that the price
will continue to soften, as it has in recent months (see Table 1).
Moreover, the fuel cycle itself provides some room for adaptation to
imbalances in uranium supply and demand over periods for a few
I I__·_____
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years--even without modification of reactor plans. If there is great
excess capacity in uranium, some stabilizing influence can be introduced
by raising enrichment tails assays, a change that may happen naturally if
prices fall far enough. Similarly, if the uranium market tightens, tails
assays can be lowered (though at 0.20% they now appear to be near the
economic optimum for diffusion plants).
Finally, it is important to note that the time now required to license
and build a new nuclear reactor is about the same or longer than that
needed to bring new uranium production capacity on line. While
government planners and utilities undoubtedly would feel more secure if
supply commitments preceeded demand, it is thus far more natural that
reactor commitments should lead uranium industry investments.
Of course, it is always possible that the mechanisms which lead to a
balance between supply and demand could be dealt a blow so severe that
the responsiveness of uranium supply would be severely damaged. There
could be some unforeseen environmental problem that would affect a number
of consumers; depletion rates world-wide could turn out to be much higher
than now expected; or a very large producer (such as Australia) could
suddenly cease exports. None of these developments seems likely. Indeed
most trends seem to be in a favorable direction on these counts, assuming
for the present that it is possible to achieve a more uniform set of
nonproliferation conditions on nuclear fuel trade. Nevertheless, these
developments are not certain, and industry expansion could be retarded by
short-term market uncertainty, perhaps magnified by the policy actions of
key exporter governments. Therefore this set of issues is an important
focus for further analysis.
STOCKPILES OF LOW-ENRICHED FUEL
The projections in Figures 5 and 6 indicate that it would be possible to
build up large stockpiles of uranium, or low-enriched uranium, over the
next decade. Of course, potential is not realization, and the cost of
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building and holding these stocks is great even given that the enrichment
capacity is available. This aspect of the system may be illustrated by a
calculation of the possible stockbuilding given firmly planned enrichment
capacity and possible uranium production capacity.
Such a computation is shown in Figure 7. The size of the stockpile is
stated in terms of the number of GWe-years of reactor reloads that the
projected capacity could provide in excess of the OECD/IAEA demand
forecasts; and the capacity factor and tails assay assumptions are those
used earlier. These stocks if built would correspond to roughly 1400
GWe-years of fuel by the late 1980s, given the full-scale operation of
enrichment facilities already committed. This quantity would represent
about three years forward supply for the entire 470 GWe estimated to be
on line in 1990.
The largest stocks would develop in the systems served by the U.S. and
Eurodif plants. The smallest would be in the utilities of Germany, Great
Britain and Holland, the partners in Urenco. While there appears to be
adequate supply for the latter, there is not a very large margin. Of
course, additional enrichment may be contracted for elsewhere. Urenco
centrifuge capacity can be expanded well before 1990, and reactor demand
in the Urenco partner countries very likely may slip. The relatively
large stocks among U.S. utilities and at DOE are due largely to demand
slippage and to continuation of a historically large unassigned
stockpile; the large stock among Eurodif utilities is due to slippage in
the reactor growth originally assumed when the Eurodif countries
(especially Italy) made their commitments to the facility.
This is the quantity that could be built up should utilities and
governments be willing to pay for them. Current evidence is that they
are not: DOE is cutting back drastically on power inputs to its
enrichment plants (estimates are of 12.5 million SWU in FY 1978 and 14
million in 1979, whereas capacity is over 17 million SWU). So the stocks
will surely be less than shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Potential cumulative stockpiles of low-enriched uranium
fuel (expressed in terms of power generation capability). These
projections assume that enrichment capacity or contracts in excess of
actual needs are used to produce fuel for stockpiles. Only committed
enrichment capacity is assumed; if planned capacity were built and
used, stocks would continue to grow in the late 1980s. Adequate
uranium would be available to build such stocks only if production
comes close to the OECD projection in Figure 6.
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Nevertheless, even with substantial cutbacks in enrichment plant
operation, the stocks held worldwide are quite large now and will grow
over time (though not necessarily in proportion to total reactor
throughput). This level of stocks, and forecast stock holding, bodes
well for fuel assurance. The system as a whole is well situated to deal
with short-term disruption, and over the next few years there will be
substantial capability to increase output in the event of short-term
supply-demand imbalance.
In short, the system is now demand limited and will be for the next five
years or more. Thus "fuel assurance" for consumers is high relative to
the last few years, provided all buyers have comparable access under the
nonproliferation regime. Problems of uranium capacity expansion may loom
in the late 1980s, but that problem is deeply interdependent with current
uncertainty about the future of reactor growth itself. That is, to the
extent that there is a medium-term uranium production capacity problem,
it is more a symptom than a cause of problems in the nuclear industry,
and an analysis of trends indicates that the uranium market can adjust to
meed demand (perhaps at rising prices) given some reasonably stable
expectations about what demand will be.
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V. CONCLUSION
In past years, nuclear fuel assurance problems have resulted from a
number of factors, including the unique technical structure of the
industry, the high degree of supplier concentration, unhealthy market
conditions and market failures, and the changing policies of countries
selling uranium and enrichment services. However, as one looks ahead to
the next decade or two, the risks associated purely with monopoly or
oligopoly of supply no longer appear to dominate the fuel assurance
problem. The actions which now feed concerns about assurance are often
those which are taken in the name of nonproliferation. Here there is a
disturbing paradox, for the desire to remove fuel insecurity as an
incentive to the spread of sensitive facilities and materials comes into
conflict with new supplier policies which put increasingly restrictive
conditions on fuel availability.
At present the international nuclear fuel system seems to be at a point
of unstable equilibrium. For the duration of INFCE there is a set of
arrangements which allow trade in uranium and enrichment to continue,
even though long-term agreements remain to be renegotiated. At the end
of INFCE, this balance will very likely be perturbed, and the world
trading system will move toward one of several conditions. On the one
hand, there may evolve a coherent, consistent set of nonproliferation
conditions applied to all fuel customers worldwide. This might occur
through a decision to decouple nonproliferation policy from export
conditions on LWR .fuel, or by common agreement on the means by which fuel
supply will be used as a policy instrument. A uniform market for fuel
would result, with the issues of full-scope safeguards and vetos over
reprocessing and retransfer somehow resolved.
Another possibility is that agreement on nonproliferation conditions will
not be reached, and some suppliers will continue with a set of rules less
restrictive than those insisted upon by the United States, and perhaps
Canada and Australia. In this case, the nuclear fuel market may split;
consumer countries would be put in the position of choosing between
68
further constraints on sovereignty (in the form of full-scope safeguards
or restrictions and uncertainties about their technology development) and
reductions in the diversity of supply. The ultimate effect of such a
development on proliferation risks is beyond our scope.
But the likely effect on fuel assurance is clearer. To the extent that
segmentation takes place, the security of nuclear fuel supply would
probably be reduced for nations in the smaller market with fewer
nonproliferation restrictions. Thus, one of the most important
determinants of fuel assurance in the next few years is the resolution of
current disputes over nonproliferation conditions. A satisfactory
accommodation of varying supplier interests and policies is of crucial
importance to the health of future nuclear markets and the security of
nuclear fuel supply.
In the U.S., the ability to deal with this situation beyond the next year
or two will be complicated by underlying assumptions in current nuclear
policy, especially as it is formulated in the Non-Proliferation Act of
1978. As discussed above, the Act has at its core the assumption that
U.S. provision of fuel and other nuclear assistance gives the U.S.
leverage over developments abroad. In effect, the Act extends the carrot
of fuel security to developing countries and others, under the condition
that they accept U.S. restrictions on nuclear power decisions. The stick
of a possible withholding of fuel supply is applied not only to these
countries but to the major industrialized supplier states as well. The
prior approval condition on retransfers and reprocessing is one way to
ensure consideration of U.S. nonproliferation concerns in the majority of
sensitive international transactions, as well as in foreign domestic
nuclear programs. However, this control is not universal and given the
excess capacity in enrichment (shown in Figure 5) and the availability of
uranium from suppliers not imposing stringent nonproliferation
conditions, it may soon be possible for an important corner of the world
fuel market to emerge from the shadow of a nonproliferation policy based
on fuel cycle control.
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At present, the Administration is taking advantage of the exemption
provisions in the Act, and the 18- to 24-month implementation period for
the full-scope safeguards requirement, to soften its impact, while
drawing recipient countries closer to the U.S. position. Indeed, the
existence of the more restrictive legislation may temporarily enhance the
Administration's negotiating position. However, while the Act may thus
contribute to U.S. nonproliferation goals in the near term, its ability
to improve long-term fuel assurance is questionable. For the large
number of countries apparently unwilling to accept extensive exercise of
U.S. power over their nuclear programs, dependence on the exemption
procedures cannot provide the predictability which is the basis for
low-enriched uranium fuel assurance in the longer term.
It is thus clear that fuel assurance is deeply intertwined with a set of
larger nuclear policy issues: not only are the conditions of access to
fuel supply dependent on resolution of larger political differences
between nations, but fuel is being used as a source of leverage in the
resolution of these differences. From the standpoint of fuel assurance,
a key issue for the future is the manner in which the U.S. policy,
expressed in the Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, will be adjusted to a
world in which the basic assumption underlying the Act--the continued
existence of U.S. fuel cycle control--is gradually losing its validity.
While it is our general conclusion that there is considerable reason for
optimism about the functioning of the supply system, given resolution of
current political conflict over export conditions, there are other
factors which will influence the performance of fuel markets and thus
affect fuel assurance. One area of policy concern is that of fuel
stockpiles. Today's stockpiles have accumulated because of government
purchase programs, preproduction and other aspects of enrichment plant
operations, and delays in reactor start-up. Once created, such stocks
can change the future environment in which the uranium industry operates,
in constructive or destructive ways depending on how the stocks are
managed. For example, great fluidity in stocks could reduce incentives
for producers to maintain inventories for spot market sales. Recent
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changes in enrichment plant operations (the end of the split tails
policy) and budgetary pressures appear to have stabilized the magnitude
of U.S.-held stocks, though there is still some question as to how these
stocks will be utilized.
Stockpiles also affect fuel assurance. If widely held, stocks can
increase the shock-absorbing capability of the nuclear fuel supply
system, making it possible to deal with short-term interruptions or
delivery problems. At present, utilities with established nuclear
programs appear to hold one, two or more years forward supply. In
addition, the governments of major consumer countries (like the FRG,
France, the U.S. and the U.K.) hold additional stocks. A more subtle
assurance issue is whether countries with small but expanding nuclear
programs have adequate access to such buffering stocks. In principle,
these stocks could be made available to countries with insecure but
smaller requirements on a loan, sale or lease basis. However, the
fundamental issue from the perspective of the recipient is likely to be
the terms of access. This will be an especially difficult consideration
for small consumer countries who believe their primary fuel assurance
problems are the proliferation-related access conditions imposed by major
suppliers.
Fuel banks have been proposed as a solution to the short-term assurance
problems of small consumers lacking buffer stocks. A relatively small
bank (equivalent, say, to 10 GWe-years of reloads) might help alleviate
assurance fears in these countries; it might also function as a symbol of
concern on the part of the suppliers. However, the value of a small fuel
bank is at least in part conditional on resolution of the larger
political conflict over terms of trade discussed above. Without such
resolution it seems unlikely that the Congress and the Administration
could relinquish control over a bank contribution.
There has also been a proposal for an International Nuclear Fuel
Authority (a major component of NPA 78). Such a system would replace a
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significant fraction of the preseht market, with its overlay of bilateral
and multilateral conditions, with a global authority allocating fuel
under uniform conditions. The establishment of a Fuel Authority appears
to require the achievement of the international agreement and political
accommodation discussed above, as well as success in developing a major
new international institution able to respond to and balance the needs of
many nations. We believe that this is probably impossible. Moreover, if
it were possible to achieve the first condition, there would be little
need for such an institution. Indeed, many countries (Japan, West
Germany, etc.) have a stronger international trade orientation than the
U.S. and would prefer to trust their ability to satisfy their needs in
international markets, especially if the larger political uncertainties
can be removed. The Fuel Authority proposal would undoubtedly raise
fears of costly economic inefficiencies and a potential for
politicization of allocation. It is also not evident that such a system
would provide a superior environment for expansion of the uranium
industry or satisfy the diverse interests of key supplier countries.
A second area of concern is the evolution of uranium markets. We have
argued that general conditions in the uranium market have improved,
shifting back somewhat from the extreme seller's market of the mid
1970s. However, there are impending changes. The renegotiation of
enrichment contracts by the U.S. over the next year will free a portion
of the uranium market which had been the captive of stringent enrichment
plant delivery conditions. This potential demand reduction comes at a
time when Australia is re-entering the market and large new uranium
discoveries are being made. The result may be a softening of the uranium
market. While this may be advantageous in the near term to consumers
seeking supply assurance, there may again be a reduction in uranium
investment incentives, leading to concerns about longer-term supply
adequacy.
Changes in the character of the uranium market may also increase the
likelihood of government intervention. In Canada and Australia, there
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are already mechanisms in place for managing export quantities and
prices. In addtion, these governments could use existing environmental
and other barriers to control the pace of internal industry development.
Instituted in a seller's market era, such governmental control may be
perceived as even more important in an era of weakening prices. The
dangers in cartelization would be the possibility that capacity creation
could fall out of step with demand growth, and that the supplier
countries could use their supply leverage to extract new sovereign as
well as market costs. The policies of Canada and Australia are thus of
great significance to the future security of uranium supply.
Beyond the cartelization issue, there is concern about continued reliance
on suppliers whose output may be disrupted, perhaps for reasons having
little to do with nuclear power. For example, disputes in Southern
Africa--within South Africa or over the independence of Namibia--could
lead to disruption of supply. The stability of Australian supply may
depend on the resolution of nonproliferation issues, and on the success
of the nonproliferation regime in inhibiting nuclear weapons acquisitions
and use. New proliferation events could result in political changes, in
Australia or other supplier countries, making continued supply
uncertain. Efforts to establish or maintain stable export policies in
key supplier countries and to resolve nonproliferation problems are thus
important to fuel assurance in the current highly concentrated uranium
market.
Finally, there ar6 measures which might be taken to improve medium- and
long-term assurance. These include better assessments of worldwide
uranium resources and a program of investments in better data
commensurate with the societal value (which exceeds the commercial value)
of such information. Also needed is better information on world trade
patterns in uranium and nuclear fuel so that vulnerabilities and
impending problems may be identified in time to take (or avoid) action.
In addition, limited measures might be taken to improve market
mechanisms. These could include removal of barriers, or the creation of
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incentives, for the entry of new uranium suppliers. What is needed, in
our view, is not additional institutional overlay, but rather efforts to
avoid future problems in the evolution of healthy trade relationships,
within the framework of the nonproliferation agreements which dominate
the assurance issue.
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